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The paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to 
implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some 
countries have better institutions than others. We analyse this question by using 
an empirical econometric model based on Poisson regression with cross-section 
data covering 51 US states, 13 Canada states and 51 other countries. The results 
show that both the background of the chairperson of electricity market 
regulatory agency when reforms started and the minister/governor at that time 
and institutional endowments of a country are important determinants of how 
far reforms have gone in a country. Our results also suggest that any 
improvement in the investment environment positively contributes to the scope 
of reforms. On the other hand, there seems to be a negative relationship between 
reform progress and civil liberties, which may prove that reforms may be limited 
in democratic countries with strong civil society institutions such as trade unions 
or other organized structures in the society that may consider reforms as 
‘harmful’ to their self-interest. 
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One of the main objectives of any economic reform is to bring changes in the 
institutional arrangement so that economic activities can be performed more 
efficiently. Besides, reforming any sector in an economy requires changing the 
institutional environment, changing the organisational structure and modifying 
the governance mechanism. Since the late 1980s, power market reform has 
become the standard prescription of the multilateral donor agencies like the IMF 
and the World Bank and the reform program has been implemented vigorously 
for about three decades now. Although the content of each reform program has 
differed from one country to another, the policy of functional disintegration, the 
establishment of regulatory authorities, the formation of wholesale and retail 
power markets and the privatization of the electricity industry have been 
generally regarded as the natural components of a reform program without 
paying much attention to the institutional environment of the country. 
 
Figure 1 presents the relationship between institutional structure and reform 
process. As can be seen in Figure 1, whole reform process takes place and is 
directly affected by the macro level institutional structure of the country in 
which reforms are put into practice. The examples of macro level institutional 
structure of a country include its legal system, measures that guarantee security 
of property rights in this country, the degree of political and civil rights provided 
by the political regime, investment environment in the country and so on. 
Through reform measures, the pre-reform structure of power market is 
transformed into post-reform structure. In general, pre-reform structure 
corresponds to public monopolies or regulated private monopolies and post-
reform structure refers to a competitive electricity market where competition at 
retail or, at least, wholesale level is possible. Usually, post-reform structure has 




some undesirable features that trigger further reforms in the power market. So, 
post-reform structure of the previous wave of reforms constitutes the pre-
reform structure of the latter wave of reforms and the process goes on as such. 
These cycles of reforms produce economic, social, political and environmental 
impacts, which may have an impact on the decisions concerning the direction of 
reforms. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between institutional structure and reform process 
 
 
Today, most countries have initiated some reform of their power sector despite 
the fact that not much progress has been made in many parts of the world, 
especially in developing countries. As reform pauses or progresses slowly, 
developing countries in particular face problems such as lack of adequate 
funding for new capacity addition, neglect of utility operation and management, 




and increase in government involvement in the management and decision-
making of the industry, contrary to the expected objectives of the reform 
(Bhattacharyya, 2007). The purpose of this paper is to find out whether the 
institutional endowments of a specific country constitute a strong, or a weak, 
constraint on how far the power market reform has gone in that country. So, we 
try to check whether the question of why some countries are able to implement 
more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries 
have better institutions than others. This paper develops the empirical case that 
differences in institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in the extent 
of the reforms implemented in each country. 
 
The interest and motivation for this topic arises from the relatively recent 
agreement that has emerged among scholars in regarding institutions as a key 
factor shaping the outcome of an economic transformation. This objective is 
pursued by discussing implications of the conceptual framework proposed by 
the New Institutional Economics for power market reform. Besides, evidence 
resulting from an econometric empirical analysis that investigates the 
relationship between institutions and reforms is presented as well. 
 
The reform experience so far (especially in developing countries) suggests two 
consistent findings. First, institutional endowments of a country (such as judicial 
independence, integrity of the legal system, protection of property rights, legal 
enforcement of contracts and degree of polity) largely determine the extent of 
the reforms. Second, despite the different approaches in the design of regulatory 
institutions, a separate agency from the government with reasonable levels of 
autonomy and technical expertise has emerged as the preferred model for a 
regulatory institution. Due to path dependency, the chairperson of electricity 
market regulatory agency when reforms started or were considered and the 
governor/minister responsible for energy policy at that time play a critical role 
in the process. Therefore, in this study, we focus on these macro (general 
institutional endowments) and micro (background of the chairperson and the 
minister/governor) variables as key factors explaining differences in the extent 
of the reforms implemented in various countries. 





We try to answer the following research questions: (i) do differences in 
institutional structures of countries play an important role in explaining how far 
reforms have gone in these countries? (ii) if they do, how do specific institutional 
endowments of a country affect its reform performance? (iii) does the 
background of the chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms started or 
were considered or that of the governor or minister responsible for energy 
policy at that time have an impact on reform progress?   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a conceptual 
framework and literature review on the New Institutional Economics. Section 3 
focuses on what we have learned from NIE for electricity market reform. Section 
4 summarizes the methodological framework. Section 5 describes data. 
Following section presents empirical analysis and discusses the results. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual framework and literature review 
 
In recent years the role of institutions in promoting and sustaining economic 
change has been an issue of interest for both theoretical and empirical analyses. 
The main question is “what determines the divergent patterns of evolution of 
countries or economies over time?” Africa’s disappointing economic 
performance, the East Asian financial crisis, and the weak record of the former 
Soviet Union have also contributed to an increasing focus on the role of 
institutions in determining a country’s economic growth and performance (Aron, 
2000). Within this context, New Institutional Economics (NIE) has emerged as 
the body of economic thought that considers institutions to be relevant to 
economic theory, and criticizes the neo-classical mainstream for having pushed 
them out of the discipline; it deals especially with the nature, origin and 
evolution of institutions, and their effects on economic performance (Chavance, 
2009). 
 




The increasing focus on NIE is also evident in World Bank publications. World 
Bank (1997, 2002) recommends that states develop strong regulatory 
mechanisms to encourage legal accountability, minimize corruption, and foster 
competition via privatization. The World Bank regards privatization as a solution 
to rent-seeking behaviour of corrupt officials. In response to the bureaucracy’s 
drain on public resources, competition, it is argued, will raise the transaction cost 
of seeking protection and subsidy from the state, and henceforth promote 
efficiency between firms. 
 
Presenting an extensive literature review on NIE is both outside the scope of this 
paper and not possible given limitations on the length of the study. Therefore, in 
this section, we summarize the main characteristics of NIE, mention its 
difference from “old” institutional economics, review central themes in NIE (such 
as property rights, transaction costs, path dependency and the difference 
between institutions and organizations), cite main criticisms against it, and 
finally provide some principal examples of empirical work based on NIE. 
Although there is some academic work that investigates the impact of 
institutions on electricity market reform outcome (e.g. Haney & Pollitt (2011)); 
to the best of our knowledge, this study constitutes the first empirical work that 
focuses on the possible implications of NIE for electricity market reform. 
 
Oliver Williamson is the inventor (in 1975) of the term ‘new institutional 
economics’, which from the 1990s on came to refer to idea that ‘institutions 
matter’ and that these can be analysed (Chavance, 2009). New institutional 
economics abandons the standard neoclassical assumptions that individuals 
have perfect information and unbounded rationality and that transactions are 
costless and instantaneous (Ménard & Shirley, 2008). The NIE starts from the 
reality that information is rarely complete, and transactions thus have costs 
associated with them, such as costs of finding out what the relevant prices are, of 
negotiating and of concluding contracts, and then of monitoring and enforcing 
them. Institutions are broadly defined as means of reducing these information 
and transaction costs (Harriss, Hunter, & Lewis, 1997). So, the NIE can be seen as 
a development of neo-classical economics to include the role of transaction costs 




in exchange and so to take account of institutions as critical constraints on 
economic performance. For new institutionalists, the performance of a market 
economy (or scale and scope of an economic reform process) depends upon the 
formal and informal institutions and modes of organization that facilitate private 
transactions and cooperative behaviour. 
 
Douglass North is a particularly significant exponent of the NIE. The main 
message stemming from North’s analysis is that institutions affect economic 
performance by influencing the level of transaction costs and, hence, the 
feasibility and profitability of engaging in economic activity. In other words, 
institutions determine the opportunity set and provide a stable structure to 
human interaction by reducing uncertainty (North, 1990). For him, institutions 
are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they are 
created to serve the interests of those with greater political and economic power 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005). 
 
The NIE is ‘new’ because there is an older school of institutionalism in 
economics. According to many scholars, the origins of institutional economics 
can be traced back to Coase (1937), whose most important message was that 
when it is costly to transact, institutions matter (Gagliardi, 2008). The 
assumption of standard economic theory that transaction costs were zero was a 
great analytical convenience and, for a long time, went unquestioned. Upon 
pushing the logic of zero transaction costs to completion, however, serious gaps, 
errors, and anomalies were exposed by Ronald Coase, who was the first to 
perceive and demonstrate the conceptual problems that resided therein 
(Ghertman & Ménard, 2009). However, unlike old institutional economics, NIE 
does not abandon neoclassical economic theory. While new institutionalists 
reject the neoclassical assumption of perfect information and instrumental 
rationality, they accept orthodox assumptions of scarcity and competition. 
 
Having briefly mentioned the basic idea behind NIE let me focus on central 
themes in it. NIE assumes the existence of a fundamental relationship between 
property rights and transaction costs, on the one hand, and property rights and 




institutions, on the other. The establishment and maintenance of property rights 
entail transaction costs and property rights are institutions by themselves 
(Musole, 2009). So, property rights, which define the use, income rights and 
transferability of assets, constitute the core of the economic institutions; and the 
concept of transaction costs is central to the discussion of property rights. When 
rights are not clearly defined, transaction costs increase and market failures 
occur. For new institutionalists, the aim of institutions is to reduce transaction 
costs so as to allow agents to seize on economic opportunities, and an efficient 
institution is simply an arrangement that minimizes such costs, or one which 
maximizes the joint wealth of all the parties concerned net of transaction costs 
(Brousseau & Glachant, 2008). 
 
Actually, there is no consensus on how transaction costs should be defined. 
Instead, several definitions exist in the literature. For example, transaction costs 
have variously been defined as the cost of using the price mechanism; the costs 
of exchanging ownership titles; the costs of running the economic system; the 
costs associated with the transfer, capture and protection of rights; the costs of 
measuring valuable attributes of that which is being exchanged, as well as the 
costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements; the ex-ante costs of drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and the ex-post costs of haggling, 
contract governance, and bonding costs to secure commitment, the resources 
used to establish and maintain property rights; or simply the ‘economic 
equivalent of friction in physical systems’ (Musole, 2009).  
 
North (1990) considers transaction costs as partly market costs and partly the 
costs of time that each party must devote to gathering information, to searching, 
and so on. In addition to this categorisation, North mentions a type of transaction 
cost that does not go through the marketplace, called “non-market transaction 
costs”. This type of transaction cost includes the high costs of searching where 
information is not efficiently distributed, and the substantial costs of undertaking 
economic activity in compliance with rules and regulations. This type of 
transaction cost includes costs of queuing, bribing officials, cutting through red 
tape, time involved in obtaining permits to do business, and so forth. Besides, it is 




argued that transaction costs not only exist but also they are huge. It is thought 
that transaction costs may represent about 50-60% of net national product of 
modern market economies. In less developed economies, transaction costs are 
thought to make up an even higher fraction of the overall GDP, and sometimes no 
exchange takes place due to these high costs (Musole, 2009).  
 
Another central theme in NIE is path dependency. For institutionalists, the 
process of institutional change is incremental and largely path dependent. Path 
dependence implies that if the process that leads to the emergence of a particular 
set of institutions is relevant and constraints future choice, then not only history 
matters but, more important, poor performance and long-run divergent patterns 
of development are determined by the same source. Path dependence may 
explain why some countries succeed and others do not (Gagliardi, 2008). 
Therefore, getting the institutions right is critical because getting them wrong 
can lead to path-dependency, whereby inefficient economic systems persist. 
Relatively inefficient paths can, for example, be persistently followed over fairly 
long historical periods. In fact, according to North, this is the case most 
frequently found in history (North, 1990). The NIE approach suggests that the 
differences in economic performance are related to institutional endowments. 
The economic performance of a country depends on whether an independent 
judiciary, clearly defined property rights, control structures for enforcing 
property rights and enforceable contracting arrangements exist or not. Given the 
institutional environment, the opportunities provided by the institutional 
environment will be reflected in the nature and performance of organisations 
that develop. Hence transition from one state to another is constrained by the 
institutional arrangements (Bhattacharyya, 2007). In short, NIE maintains that 
once an economy is on an “inefficient” path that produces stagnation it can 
persist (and historically has persisted) because of the nature of path dependence. 
 
Unlike ‘old’ institutional economics, North (1990) states that it is essential to 
distinguish institutions from organizations. For him, if institutions are the rules 
of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players. 
Organizations are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to 




achieve objectives. They include political bodies (e.g. political parties), economic 
bodies (e.g. firms, trade unions, regulatory agencies), social bodies (e.g. clubs, 
associations) and educational bodies (e.g. schools, universities). Moreover, North 
(1990) argues that institutions and organizations are interdependent entities. 
The institutional framework determines the opportunities in a society and the 
emergence and evolution of certain organizations. In turn, organizations 
influence how institutions evolve, thus being agents of institutional change. 
 
Despite recognizing that inefficient institutions are difficult to surmount once 
they become path-dependent, the critics of NIE argue, the NIE fails to explain 
how to overcome this path dependency. Institutions are important determinants 
of economic performance. But when it comes to new general insights about how 
that determination works, the NIE adds nothing to what we already have. No 
new predictions are derived; no new policies are recommended (Harriss et al., 
1997). 
 
As mentioned before, there is no previous empirical study that applies NIE 
approach to the analysis of power market reforms, so we cannot provide a 
review of previous studies similar to this one. Instead, we will mention some 
examples of applied work based on the NIE approach. Appendix 1 presents 
details of these econometric studies including hypotheses tested, dependent 
variables, explanatory variables, results, data and methodology. Appendix 2 
classifies previous econometric studies by their focus. Besides, in applied NIE 
studies, various variables are used to measure different aspects of institutional 
structure. Basically, there are three aspects of institutions: the presence of 
institutions, the organization (or form) of institutions and the outcome of 
institutions. The presence of institutions concerns whether specific institutions 
exist, without paying attention to their organization or outcome. The 
organization (or form) of institutions is to do with the way institutions are 
actually operated. The outcome of institutions is to do with an overall 
assessment of the impact of the institutions on the performance of the countries 
or industries (Green, Lorenzoni, Pérez, & Pollitt, 2009). Variables in previous 
studies either measure one of these aspects or are used as control variables. 




Appendix 3 presents variables employed in previous econometric studies by 
what they measure. 
 
In their papers, Acemoglu et al. (2008; 2001) and Nunn (2008) focus on the 
relationship between historical institutions and present economic performance. 
Acemoglu et al. (2008) draw a distinction between economic and political 
inequality. They point out that while land inequality is negatively correlated with 
school enrolment in the data for US states in the early part of the twentieth 
century, it is positively correlated across areas in the state of Cundinamarca in 
Colombia. They ask whether political inequality could have played a role in 
driving inequality in schooling. The answer they found is that it did. Acemoglu et 
al. (2008) also propose an explanation of why land inequality may affect 
outcomes differently, arguing that the relationship depends on whether the 
polities are weakly or strongly institutionalized. In weakly institutionalized 
polities, in which formal political institutions do not adequately constrain the 
executive, economic inequality may generate an effective counterweight to the 
executive. In strongly institutionalized polities, economic inequality may enable 
the few rich to capture politics to the detriment of the general public. On the 
other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2001) use differences in European mortality rates to 
estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted 
very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated 
institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not 
settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions 
persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an 
instrument for current institutions, Acemoglu et al. (2001) estimate large effects 
of institutions on income per capita. They find that once the effect of institutions 
is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have 
lower incomes. The empirical evidence stemming from Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
seems to provide support to the idea that current institutions, inherited from the 
past, have a large effect on current income per capita. In a similar way, Nunn 
(2008) estimated the impact of the fraction of slaves in a country’s population 
circa 1750 on its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the year 2000. He 
finds that, within the group of New World countries, those that had larger 




fractions of slaves in the mid-eighteenth century were poorer at the end of the 
twentieth century. A similar relationship holds for a smaller sample of countries 
from the British West Indies, for which Nunn (2008) uses slavery data from 
1830. He also finds a negative impact of slavery on economic development across 
U.S. states. 
 
In the literature, there are many applied papers that investigate the relationship 
between political institutions and economic growth. The primary examples 
include Persson and Tabellini (2008), Besley and Kudamatsu  (2008), Aghion et 
al. (2008), Drury et al. (2006), Isham et al. (1997), Alesina et al. (1996), Caselli et 
al. (1996), Clague et al. (1996), Mauro (1995), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), 
Helliwell (1994) and Scully (1988). Persson and Tabellini (2008) propose an 
empirical method for estimating the impact of regime change on the growth rate 
of income per capita, in the wake of heterogeneous effects of regime change. 
Their nonparametric matching estimates suggest that previous studies 
underestimated the growth effects of democracy. They also argue that the two 
types of regime change are asymmetric, in that a switch from democracy to 
autocracy has a bigger negative impact on growth than the positive impact of a 
switch from autocracy to democracy. Besley and Kudamatsu  (2008) start with 
the observation that autocratic regimes do not always perform badly, at least as 
judged by economic indicators, such as the growth rate of income per capita or 
other components of the human development index, that is, health and 
education. They argue that economic performance depends on the accountability 
of political leaders, such as heads of states, and that this property can be 
achieved in different ways in different political regimes. They show that 
autocracy performs better than democracy if the selectorate is powerful and the 
distributional conflict is significant yet not too salient. In all other cases, 
democracy yields better results. Aghion et al. (2008) also focus on the impact of 
democracy on growth and argue that the lack of robustness of this relationship 
may be due to the fact that democratic institutions differentially impact sectoral 
growth rates, depending on a sector’s level of technological development and, in 
particular, depending on whether the sector is close or far away from the 
technology frontier. They develop a model to illustrate this dependence. Without 




controlling for the interaction between democracy and sectoral characteristics, 
they find no significant impact of democracy on growth. But once democracy is 
interacted with sectoral distance to the technology frontier, they find that 
democracy has a larger impact on the growth of sectors that are closer to the 
technology frontier and that the level of democracy has then also an independent 
positive effect on growth.  
 
Drury et al. (2006) argue that one of democracy’s indirect benefits is its ability to 
mitigate the detrimental effect of corruption on economic growth. They maintain 
that although corruption certainly occurs in democracies, the electoral 
mechanism inhibits politicians from engaging in corrupt acts that damage overall 
economic performance and thereby jeopardize their political survival. Using 
time-series cross-section data for more than 100 countries for the period 1982-
97, they show that corruption has no significant effect on economic growth in 
democracies, while non-democracies suffer significant economic harm from 
corruption. Isham et al. (1997) use a cross-national data set on the performance 
of government investment projects financed by the World Bank to examine the 
link between government efficiency and governance. They find a strong 
empirical link between civil liberties and the performance of government 
projects. They show that even after controlling for other determinants of 
performance, countries with the strongest civil liberties have projects with an 
economic rate of return 8-22 percentage points higher than countries with the 
weakest civil liberties.  
 
Alesina et al. (1996) investigate the relationship between political instability and 
per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 
1982. They find that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of 
government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. They also 
discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth. Caselli et 
al. (1996) argue that there are two sources of inconsistency in existing cross-
country empirical work on growth: correlated individual effects and endogenous 
explanatory variables. They estimate a variety of cross-country growth 
regressions using a generalized method of moments estimator that eliminates 




both problems. In one application, they find that per capita incomes converge to 
their steady-state levels at a rate of approximately 10 percent per year. They 
maintain that this result stands in sharp contrast to the current consensus, which 
places the convergence rate at 2 percent.  
 
Clague et al. (1996) present and test empirically a theory of property and 
contract rights. They test whether any incentive an autocrat has to respect such 
rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income, and 
increases with his planning horizon. They find an empirical relationship between 
property and contract rights and an autocrat’s time in power. They uncover that 
in lasting (but not in new) democracies, the same rule of law and individual 
rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract 
rights. They also show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated 
with property and contract rights. Mauro (1995) analyses a data set consisting of 
subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the 
judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of 
countries. Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic 
growth. Mauro (1995) argues that the results are robust to controlling for 
endogeneity by using an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an 
instrument.  
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) study the relationship between politics and economic 
growth in a simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflict among 
agents endowed with varying capital/labour shares. They show that the greater 
the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the 
lower growth. Their empirical results imply that inequality in land and income 
ownership is negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth. Similarly, 
using cross-sectional and pooled data for up to 125 countries over the period 
from 1960 to 1985, Helliwell (1994) evaluates the two-way linkages between 
democracy and economic growth. The effects of income on democracy are found 
to be robust and positive. The study assesses the effects of several measures of 
democracy and personal freedoms on growth in a comparative growth 
framework. The general result from the paper is that it is still not possible to 




identify any systematic net effects of democracy on subsequent economic 
growth. 
 
Finally, Scully (1988) compares the growth rates of per capita output and 
efficiency measures for 115 market economies over the period 1960-80 with 
measures of political, civil, and economic liberty. The study finds that the 
institutional framework has significant and large effects on the efficiency and 
growth rate of economies. The findings suggest that politically open societies, 
which subscribe to the rule of law, private property, and the market allocation of 
resources, grow at three times the rate and are two and one-half times as 
efficient as societies in which these freedoms are abridged. 
 
P. Keefer and Knack (2002), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Knack and Keefer 
(1997) concentrate on the relationship between social structure and economic 
growth. P. Keefer and Knack (2002) argue that social polarization reduces the 
security of property and contract rights and, through this channel, reduces 
growth. Their first hypothesis is supported by cross-country evidence indicating 
that polarization in the form of income inequality, land inequality, and ethnic 
tensions is inversely related to a commonly-used index of the security of 
contractual and property rights. They find that when the security of property 
rights is controlled for in cross-country growth regressions, the relationship 
between inequality and growth diminishes considerably. They maintain that this 
and other evidence provide support for their second hypothesis that inequality 
reduces growth in part through its effect on the security of property rights. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that explaining cross-country differences in 
growth rates requires not only an understanding of the link between growth and 
public policies, but also an understanding of why countries choose different 
public policies. Their paper shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-
country differences in public policies and other economic indicators. In the case 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, they find that economic growth is associated with low 
schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted 
foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient 




infrastructure. They show that Africa’s high ethnic fragmentation explains a 
significant part of these characteristics. 
 
Knack and Keefer (1997) also present evidence that “social capital” matters for 
measurable economic performance, using indicators of trust and civic norms 
from the World Values Surveys for a sample of 29 market economies. They reveal 
that membership in formal groups is not associated with trust or with improved 
economic performance. They find trust and civic norms are stronger in nations 
with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain predatory 
actions of chief executives, and with better-educated and ethnically 
homogeneous populations. 
 
The relationship between economic institutions (economic equality, protection 
of property rights etc.) and economic growth are investigated by various authors 
like Assane and Grammy (2003), Barro  (1991, 1996, 2000), Keefer and Knack 
(1997), Vanssay and Spindler (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Spindler 
(1991). Assane and Grammy (2003) examine the effect of “quality” of the 
institutional framework on economic development. Their empirical results 
support the hypothesis that “good” institutions improve efficiency and accelerate 
growth. The positive effect of institutional “quality” is more pronounced with 
mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom. Their results also indicate 
that “good” institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve 
conditional convergence. They infer from the results that economic development 
requires not only physical and human capital formation, but also freedom to 
choose and institutional support. 
 
Barro (1991) shows that, for 98 countries in the period 1960-1985, the growth 
rate of real per capita GDP is positively related to initial human capital (proxied 
by 1960 school enrolment rates) and negatively related to the initial (1960) level 
of real per capita GDP. It is found that countries with higher human capital also 
have lower fertility rates and higher ratios of physical investment to GDP. The 
study uncovers that growth is inversely related to the share of government 
consumption in GDP but insignificantly related to the share of public investment, 




and that growth rates are positively related to measures of political stability and 
inversely related to a proxy for market distortions. Barro (1996) analyses 
growth and democracy for a panel of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. 
The study finds that the favourable effects on growth include maintenance of the 
rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and high human 
capital. Once these kinds of variables and the initial level of real per capita GDP 
are held constant, it is found that the overall effect of democracy on growth is 
weakly negative. Barro (1996) suggests a nonlinear relationship in which more 
democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses 
growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained. It is also 
seen that improvements in the standard of living -measured by GDP, health 
status, and education- substantially raise the probability that political freedoms 
will grow. Barro (2000) finds little evidence from a broad panel of countries 
concerning overall relation between income inequality and rates of growth and 
investment. The study reveals that higher inequality tends to retard growth in 
poor countries and encourage growth in richer places. According to the results, 
the Kuznets curve -whereby inequality first increases and later decreases during 
the process of economic development- emerges as a clear empirical regularity.  
 
Keefer and Knack (1997) question the early neoclassical prediction that poor 
countries would grow faster than wealthy countries, because of technological 
advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter. They argue that the 
reverse has occurred: poor countries are falling back rather than catching up. 
They suggest that deficient institutions underlie this divergence. Employing 
various indicators of institutional quality, including the rule of law, the 
pervasiveness of corruption, and the risk of expropriation and contract 
repudiation, they show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is 
determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic 
activity in these countries takes place. 
 
Vanssay and Spindler (1994) use an augmented Solow model, with cross section 
data, to measure the effect on per-capita income of the entrenchment of various 
rights in a country’s constitution and the level of economic freedom in a country. 




Their results suggest that entrenchment of any single right seldom has a 
significant general economic effect, while the effect of economic freedom is 
significant and substantial. The paper then considers whether such evidence 
could support the proposition that “constitutions do not matter.” While it 
concludes otherwise, it does caution against incurring excessive negotiation 
costs to obtain entrenchment of a comprehensive “wish list” of rights. 
 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) question whether inequality is harmful for growth. 
They argue that in a society where distributional conflict is important, political 
decisions produce economic policies that tax investment and growth-promoting 
activities in order to redistribute income. The paper formulates a theoretical 
model that captures this idea. They support their model’s implications by the 
evidence. They show that both historical panel data and post-war cross sections 
indicate a significant and large negative relation between inequality and growth. 
Finally, Spindler (1991) uses the Wright ratings of economic freedom to 
investigate the relationship between economic freedom and economic 
development for most countries in the world. The study finds that relationship is 
apparently strong and direct for such economic freedoms as freedom of property 
and freedom of movement but inverse for freedom of association.  
 
The examples mentioned above confirm the idea that NIE approach has the 
potential for application in very diverse areas. In the following sections, we will 
present the first empirical study that analyses electricity market reforms with 
tools supplied by NIE. 
 
3. What we have learned from NIE for electricity market reform 
 
New institutional economics contributes to the analysis of power sector reforms 
in multiple ways. First of all, the literature that we summarized above clearly 
shows that institutions matter for any economic reform and electricity market 
reform is not an exception. In essence, electricity market reform is an 
institutional reform that necessitates de facto or de jure regime change, creation 
of new institutional structures and rearrangement or removal of existing ones. 




Institutions may determine the divergent patterns of evolution of reform 
processes in various countries over time. In the literature, the relationship 
between institutions and economic transformations has been investigated by 
many scholars. For instance, the link between political institutions and economic 
change is explored by Aghion et al. (2008), Alesina et al. (1996), Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Besley and Kudamatsu (2008), Caselli et al. (1996), Clague et al. 
(1996), Drury et al. (2006), Helliwell (1994), Isham et al. (1997), Mauro (1995), 
Persson and Tabellini (2008) and Scully (1988); while the impact of economic 
institutions on economic change is investigated by Assane and Grammy (2003), 
Barro (1991, 1996, 2000), Philip Keefer and Knack (1997), Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), Spindler (1991) and Vanssay and Spindler (1994). 
 
Second, while analysing reforms in electricity markets, we need to abandon the 
standard neoclassical assumptions that we have perfect information and 
unbounded rationality and that transactions are costless and instantaneous. The 
NIE implies that information during whole reform process is rarely complete, 
and transactions related to reform process have costs associated with them, such 
as costs of finding out what and how to reform, of negotiating the reform 
direction with interested parties, of passing necessary legislation, and then of 
monitoring and enforcing it.  
 
The third contribution of NIE is its suggestion that reformers should see 
institutions as means of reducing information and transaction costs related to 
reform design and implementation; and never forget that institutions may easily 
turn into critical constraints on reform performance if not taken into account 
properly. Simply, the performance of a reform program largely depends upon the 
formal and informal institutions, which affect the reforms by influencing the level 
of transaction costs and, hence, the feasibility of engaging in a reform initiative.  
 
Fourth, NIE maintains that there is a fundamental relationship between property 
rights, transaction costs and institutions. When property rights are not clearly 
defined in the course of an electricity market reform, transaction costs increase 
and reforms may fail.  





The fifth advise from NIE for electricity market reform is that policy makers 
should pay due attention to non-market transaction costs faced by the firms in 
the market and do their best to eliminate or, at least, minimize them. 
 
The sixth repercussion of NIE relevant to electricity reform is that the process of 
electricity market reform is largely path dependent, which may explain why 
some countries succeed and others do not in reforming their power sectors. So, 
getting the institutions right is critical to reform success as getting them wrong 
can lead to path-dependency, whereby inefficient electricity markets may 
persist. So, to prevent inefficient institutional structures in the subsequent 
reform phases, the utmost attention should be paid to arrangements at the very 
beginning of the reform programs. Right people should set up right structures. In 
this context, the chairperson of the electricity market regulator and the minister 
responsible for energy policy when reforms started may have an important 
impact on subsequent reform progress. 
 
To sum up, the NIE approach suggests that the differences in performances of 
different reform processes are related to institutional endowments. The success 
or failure of a power market reform initiative depends to some extent on 
whether a strong legal system, a proper investment environment, clearly defined 
property rights, control structures for enforcing necessary legislation and 
enforceable contracting arrangements exist or not. When we take into account 
the notion that democratic systems encourage and support private participation 
and free enterprise in the economy, we may assume that democratic countries 
advance more rapidly in terms of power market reform process than those with 
less democratic systems. Given the institutional environment, the opportunities 
provided by the institutional environment will be reflected in the nature and 
performance of reform process. 
 






In our study, we focus on the background of the chairperson of electricity market 
regulatory agency when reforms started or were considered, that of the governor 
or minister responsible for energy policy at that time and macro institutional 
indicators to explain the progress in reform process in a country.  
 
The ministers responsible for energy-related issues in countries or governors in 
US or Canadian states set general policies for electricity industry and the 
regulatory agencies put these policies into practice. Both policy setting and 
policy implementation are crucial factors that explain the reform progress in any 
country. Besides, path dependency implies that the chairperson of electricity 
market regulatory agency when reforms started or were considered and the 
governor or minister responsible for energy policy at that time play a critical role 
in the progress of subsequent reform process. For instance, in Argentina, Carlos 
Bastos, Secretary of Energy between 1991-96, led the privatisation of the 
electricity sector within the general policy framework of the Minister of 
Economy. Bastos was formerly an electrical engineer, researcher and a 
consultant on electricity issues for the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Harvard Institute for International Economic Development. He brought the 
conceptual vision and insistence on a reformed, privately owned and competitive 
sector. He gave general direction and control to the privatisation of the energy 
sector, and took on the political battles, including with parties from the existing 
industry. The reform was along similar lines to the UK, and even went further 
with respect to restructuring (Littlechild & Skerk, 2004). 
 
Similarly, UK has been successful in market reform because it managed to find a 
set of quite able, fair-minded regulators. Prof. Stephen C. Littlechild was Director 
General of Electricity Supply (DGES), in charge of the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (OFFER), from its foundation in September 1989 to 1998. Littlechild, 
one of the architects of the successful UK electricity reform, has been a true 
believer in competition in electricity markets. Before the appointment, he was 
Professor of Commerce and Head of Department of Industrial Economics and 




Business Studies at the University of Birmingham from 1975 to 1989, and a 
member of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission from 1983 to 1989. In 
response to the apparent problems of the cost-recovery methods, in 1983, 
Professor Littlechild proposed a “high-powered” incentive scheme, popularly 
known as RPI-X or price cap, in which the regulator caps the allowable price or 
revenue for each firm for a pre-determined period. Thus far, in terms of 
economic efficiency, RPI-X has been a clear success. In the United Kingdom, the 
RPI-X regulatory approach has induced cost reductions well beyond 
expectations. Electricity companies have been able to greatly reduce operating 
costs in large part through substantial work force reductions. In short, the 
educational and professional backgrounds of energy minister and regulator 
played an important role in the reform progress in Argentina and the UK, 
respectively. Within this framework, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Due to path-dependency, the background of the 
chairperson of the regulator and that of the governor or minister 
responsible for energy policy when reforms started or were considered 
have an impact on overall reform progress. 
 
As in the case of any competitive market, a competitive electricity market 
requires a liberal economy with strong democratic institutions. Hence, we also 
test for following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2: In countries with strong legal systems that secure 
property rights, reforms go further. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Democratic countries advance more rapidly in terms of 
power market reform process than those with less democratic systems. 
So, expansion of civil liberties and political rights contribute to power 
market reform progress.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The reform progresses more rapidly in countries where 
there are few obstacles to investment and less corruption than in those 




where investment is hindered by bureaucratic, structural or political 
reasons. 
 
In our study, the scope of the reforms in each country is represented by the 
electricity market reform score variable. Therefore, in our analysis, we describe 
the electricity market reform score as a function of 
(a) the background of the chairperson of electricity market regulatory agency 
when reforms started or were considered (his/her experience in 
electricity industry, his/her length of term, his/her education level, 
his/her educational background in business or economics, in engineering 
or in law); 
(b) the background of the governor or minister who was responsible for 
energy policy at that time (his/her experience in electricity industry, 
his/her length of term after reforms started or were considered, his/her 
education level, his/her educational background in business or 
economics, in engineering or in law); 
(c) macro variables representing the institutional endowments of the 
countries (namely, investment freedom index, polity score, corruption 
perceptions index, property rights index, civil liberties and political rights 
scores); 
(d) control variables (i.e. population, GDP per capita, dummy variable for 
being an OECD country). 
 
In our analysis, our dependent variable is limited, that is, it is a count variable, 
which can take on nonnegative integer values, . We cannot 
take the logarithm of a count variable because it takes on the value zero. An 
appropriate approach is to model the expected value as an exponential function 
  (1) 
Since is always positive, the predicted values for y will also be positive. 
Although this is more complicated than a linear model, we know how to interpret 
the coefficients. Taking the log of Equation 1 shows that 
  (2) 
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so that the log of the expected value is linear. Using the approximation properties 
of the log function, we write 
  (3) 
In other words,  is roughly the percentage change in E(y|x), given a one-
unit increase in xi. 
 
Because Equation 1 is nonlinear in its parameters, we cannot use linear 
regression methods. We could use nonlinear least squares, which, just as with 
OLS, minimizes the sum of squared residuals. It turns out, however, that all 
standard count data distributions exhibit heteroskedasticity and nonlinear least 
squares does not exploit this. Instead, we will rely on maximum likelihood and 
the important related method of quasi-maximum likelihood estimation. Besides, 
as we know, normality is the standard distributional assumption for linear 
regression. The normality assumption is reasonable for continuous dependent 
variables that can take on a large range of values. A count variable cannot have a 
normal distribution (because the normal distribution is for continuous variables 
that can take on all values), and if it takes on very few values, the distribution can 
be very different from normal. Instead, the nominal distribution for count data is 
the Poisson distribution. A random variable Y, which only takes on nonnegative 
integer values, follows the Poisson distribution if, for k = 0, 1, 2, ... 
  (4) 
where . The mean and variance of Poisson random variable is  and  
  (5) 
Figure 2 shows the Poisson distribution for different  values. Because we are 
interested in the effect of explanatory variables on y, we must look at the Poisson 
distribution conditional on x. The Poisson distribution is entirely determined by 
its mean, so we only need to specify E(y|x). Then, the probability that y equals 
the value k, conditional on x, is (for k = 0, 1, 2, ...) 
  (6) 
  (7) 
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Here, the interpretation of  is that when there is a one unit increase in Xi, the 
percentage change of is 100 x . This distribution, which is the basis for 
the Poisson regression model, allows us to find conditional probabilities for any 
values of the explanatory variables. 
 




In principle, the Poisson model is simply a nonlinear regression. It is much easier 
to estimate the parameter with a maximum likelihood method. The log-
likelihood function is  
  (9) 
  (10) 
  (11) 
where we can drop the term  because it does not depend on . So, we 
get 
  (12) 
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While employing Poisson regression, we should keep in mind two important 
points. First, we cannot directly compare the magnitudes of the Poisson 
estimates of an exponential function with the OLS estimates of a linear function. 
Second, although Poisson analysis is a natural first step for count data, it may be 
restrictive. All of the probabilities and higher moments of the Poisson 
distribution are determined entirely by the mean. In particular, the variance is 
expected to be equal to the mean. This is restrictive but, fortunately, the Poisson 
distribution has a very nice robustness property: whether or not the Poisson 
distribution holds, we still get consistent, asymptotically normal estimators of 
the . 
 
Because of the restrictions on the length of the paper and because it is not one of 
the aims of this paper, further details of Poisson regression is not presented here 
but available from Winkelmann (2008), Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and 
Wooldridge (2009). 
 
5. Overview of data 
 
Our data set is cross-section and covers 51 states in US, 13 states in Canada and 
51 other countries2. In total, we have 115 potential observations for each 
variable. We have some missing observations in our dataset. The sample 
countries and states in our analysis are determined by data availability. There 
are two main reasons for the limited nature of the dataset. First, since our 
analysis requires data on the chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms 
started or were considered, we automatically exclude all countries without a 
regulatory agency for electricity industry. We could detect the existence of 
electricity market regulatory agencies in 135 countries. Second, out of these 135 
                                                            
2 Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom. 
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countries, we could include only those for which we could obtain data on all 
variables in our model. If excluded countries have some characteristics that 
cause them to be less likely to be included than others, that is, if the sampling of 
the population is non-random; then there may be a sampling bias. Figure 3 
provides electricity market reform score frequencies of reported and non-
reported countries. As can be seen in Figure 3, more than half of the non-
reported countries have a reform score of either 0 or 1. Besides, most of the non-
reported countries have highly inefficient and corrupted institutional structures 
that are incapable of organizing even a de facto reform program, let alone a de 
jure one. 
 




The variables used in the study are electricity market reform score; experience of 
the chairperson of electricity market regulatory agency in electricity industry 
when reforms started or were considered, his/her length of term after that time, 
his/her education level, his/her educational background in business or 
economics, in engineering or in law; electricity industry experience of the 
governor or minister who is responsible for energy policy when reforms started 
or were considered, his/her length of term after that time, his/her education 
level, his/her educational background in business or economics, in engineering 
or in law; investment freedom index, polity score, corruption perceptions index, 




property rights index, civil liberties score, political rights score; population, GDP 
per capita and dummy for being an OECD country. Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics of the variables. 
 
Since it is very difficult, if not impossible, to develop a true measure of success or 
failure of the reform process; in this paper, we focus on the reform progress 
rather than reform success or failure. Besides, reform success or failure may be 
country specific and therefore it is not easy to develop a measure of it applicable 
to all countries. On the other hand, reform progress is a variable standardizable 
through countries and therefore a suitable indicator for a cross-country analysis. 
However, the measurement of reform progress also requires a great deal of 
effort as the main steps of electricity reform are usually established 
progressively and have a qualitative dimension. To measure reform progress, we 
construct an electricity market reform score variable that takes the values from 0 
to 8; depending on how many of the following reform steps have been taken in 
each country as of 2011: (1) introduction of independent power producers, (2) 
corporatization of state-owned enterprises, (3) law for electricity sector 
liberalization, (4) introduction of unbundling, (5) establishment of electricity 
market regulator, (6) introduction of privatization, (7) establishment of 
wholesale electricity market, and (8) choice of supplier. To build this variable, we 
created 8 dummy variables for each of the reform steps mentioned above and 
calculated the total number of reform steps taken in each country. Dummy 
variables for reform steps are created based on the data collected and cross-
checked from various international and national energy regulators’ web sites3. 
Figure 4 provides the histogram of the reform score variable showing the 
frequency of observations while Figure 5 shows current status of electricity 
reform in US states. When we evaluate Figure 4, we see that all countries in our 
dataset have taken at least one reform step and more than half of them have 
taken 5 or more reform steps.  
 
                                                            
3 The full list of sources from which data are obtained can be found at IERN web site 
(http://www.iern.net). 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables # of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Electricity market reform score in 2011 115 5.48 2.24 1 8 
Chairperson*      
His/her experience in electricity industry at appointment (years) 95 6.59 8.58 0 36 
Length of term (years) 100 4.97 3.05 0 14 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) 94 1.89 0.99 0 3 
Educational background in      
 - Business or economics 94 0.40 0.49 0 1 
 - Engineering 94 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 - Law 94 0.44 0.50 0 1 
 - Other 94 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Energy minister/governor**      
His/her experience in electricity industry (years) 101 3.40 4.92 0 36 
Length of term (years) 106 3.48 2.06 0 10 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) 103 1.64 0.95 0 3 
Educational background in      
 - Business or economics 103 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 - Engineering 103 0.17 0.37 0 1 
 - Law 103 0.31 0.47 0 1 
 - Other 103 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Institutional variables      
Legal system & property rights index in 2009 114 6.93 1.18 3.55 8.80 
Investment freedom index in 2011 115 70.83 12.94 25 95 
Polity score in 2010 114 8.79 3.13 -10 10 
Corruption perceptions index in 2010 115 6.37 2.06 2 9 
Property rights index in 2011 115 72.61 22.33 20 95 
Civil liberties score in 2011 115 1.60 1.15 1 6 
Political rights score in 2011 115 1.62 1.32 1 7 
Control variables      
Population in 2010 (million people) 115 41.80 166.67 0.03 1,338.30 
Log of population in 2010 115 1.83 1.86 -3.40 7.20 
GDP per capita in 2010 (thousand $) 115 36.43 22.49 1.26 172.25 
Log of GDP per capita in 2010 115 3.32 0.91 0.23 5.15 
OECD country dummy 115 0.75 0.44 0 1 
* The Chairperson refers to the chairperson of electricity market regulatory agency when reforms started or were 
considered. 
** Energy minister/governor refers to the governor or minister who was responsible for energy policy when reforms 
started or were considered. 
 













We collected data for each country on the background of the chairperson of 
electricity market regulatory agency when reforms started or were considered, 
and the governor or minister who was responsible for energy policy at that time. 
Data collection for these variables lasted 10 months from February to November 




2011. The data on chairperson include his/her experience in electricity industry, 
his/her length of term, his/her education level (BSc, MSc or PhD) and his/her 
educational background (business or economics, engineering, law, 
other/unknown). We also gathered data about the governor or minister who was 
responsible for energy policy when reforms started or were considered. 
Similarly, these data include his/her experience in electricity industry, his/her 
length of term, his/her education level (BSc, MSc or PhD) and his/her 
educational background (business or economics, engineering, law, 
other/unknown). The data on chairpersons and the ministers/governors are 
obtained from various reports and documents published by regulatory agencies 
and ministries of the countries. While deciding on which educational 
backgrounds to include into our analysis, we select the three most common 
backgrounds, namely business or economics, engineering and law. We also 
create an “other/unknown” category to represent other educational 
backgrounds. For instance, when we look at the educational backgrounds of 
chairpersons, we see that 36.6% of them have a background in law, 33.9% in 
business or economics, 17% in engineering and 12.5% in other/unknown 
educational backgrounds. Figure 6 shows the number of chairpersons and 
ministers/governors in the sample countries by their educational background 
while Figure 7 presents this by education level. Besides, Figure 8 provides the 
number of chairpersons and ministers/governors in the sample countries by 
their length of term. While evaluating Figure 8, it is important to keep in mind 
that length of term refers to length of term after the reforms started or were 
considered.  
 




















The data on polity score for each country in 2010 are obtained from Center for 
Systemic Peace (CSP, 2010). The polity score ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Investment freedom index and property 
rights index scores for 2011 are provided by Heritage Foundation (2011) and 
both indexes range from 0 to 100. In an economically free country, there would 
be no constraints on the flow of investment capital. Individuals and firms would 
be allowed to move their resources into and out of specific activities both 
internally and across the country’s borders without restriction. Such an ideal 
country receives a score of 100 in Heritage Foundation’s Investment Freedom 
Index. In practice, however, most countries have a variety of restrictions on 
investment. Some have different rules for foreign and domestic investment; 
some restrict access to foreign exchange; some impose restrictions on payments, 
transfers, and capital transactions; in some, certain industries are closed to 
foreign investment. Moreover, labour regulations, corruption, red tape, weak 
infrastructure, and political and security conditions can also affect the freedom 
that investors have in a market. The index evaluates a variety of restrictions 
typically imposed on investment. Points are deducted from the ideal score of 100 
for the restrictions found in a country’s investment regime. Moreover, the 
property rights index assesses the ability of individuals to accumulate private 




property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the government. It 
measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights 
and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the 
likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyses the 
independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, 
and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The more 
certain the legal protection of property, the higher a country’s score; similarly, 
the greater the chances of government expropriation of property, the lower a 
country’s score. Figure 9 presents a scatter plot of investment freedom index and 
property rights index. 
 




Corruption perceptions index for 2010 is taken from Transparency International 
(2011). It ranks countries according to their perceived levels of public sector 
corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Perceptions are 
used because corruption is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to 
measure. The index is an aggregate indicator that combines different sources of 
information about corruption, making it possible to compare countries. The 




index draws on assessments and opinion surveys carried out by independent 
and reputable institutions. These surveys and assessments include questions 
related to the bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, 
embezzlement of public funds, and the effectiveness of public sector anti-
corruption efforts. Figure 10 provides a visual plot of corruption perceptions 
index for 2010. 
 
Civil liberties and political rights scores for 2011 are taken from Freedom House 
(2011). The Freedom in the World survey conducted by Freedom House 
provides an annual evaluation of the state of global freedom as experienced by 
individuals. The survey measures freedom -the opportunity to act spontaneously 
in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centres of 
potential domination- according to two broad categories: political rights and civil 
liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political 
process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate 
elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and 
elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are 
accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression 
and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state. Political rights and civil liberties 
scores range from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level 
of freedom. Figure 11 shows the number of countries and states in the sample by 
their civil liberties and political rights scores. 
 












Data on populations and GDP per capita of the countries and the states in 2010 
are taken from World Bank (2010), Statistics Canada and US Census Bureau. 
Since using the logarithm of a variable enables us to interpret coefficients easily 
and is an effective way of shrinking the distance between values, we transform 
population and GDP per capita variables into logarithmic form and use these 




transformed variables in our model. Finally, we include a dummy variable into 
our dataset to represent OECD member countries. 
 
6. Empirical analysis and discussion of the results 
 
Throughout our analysis, we explain electricity market reform score as a 
function of (i) the background of the chairperson of electricity market regulatory 
agency when reforms started or were considered, (ii) the background of the 
governor or minister who was responsible for energy policy at that time, (iii) 
macro institutional variables, and (iv) control variables. 
 
The assumption of the Poisson model is that the conditional mean is equal to the 
conditional variance. Poisson regression will have difficulty with over dispersed 
data, i.e. variance much larger than the mean. Therefore, before starting our 
analysis, we need to look at the mean and variance of our dependent variable, 
that is, electricity market reform score. In our case, the mean of reform score 
variable is 5.48 and the variance is 5.01. Even though these numbers are for the 
unconditional mean and variance it can be informative because it gives us some 
indication of whether a Poisson regression should be used. In our analysis, 
reform score variable appears not to be overdispersed, as the mean is larger than 
the variance, and the predictor variables should help, so it may be reasonable to 
fit a Poisson regression model. Moreover, to make sure that Poisson regression is 
an appropriate tool to analyse our dataset, we report the results of the two 
Poisson goodness-of-fit tests (Deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit tests) in the 
regression output table. The large value for chi-square in these tests may be an 
indicator that the Poisson distribution is not a good choice. A significant (p<0.05) 
test statistic from the tests indicates that the Poisson model is inappropriate. In 
our model, values for chi-square in these tests are quite small and the test 
statistics are insignificant even at 80% level. So, it is obvious that Poisson 
regression is an appropriate method for our analysis. 
 




We start the empirical analysis by estimating a Poisson regression for our 
model4. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) recommend the use of robust standard 
errors when estimating a Poisson model, so we use robust standard errors for 
the parameter estimates. Table 2 presents Poisson estimation results. In the 
output table, we also report “Log pseudolikelihood”, which is the log likelihood of 
the fitted model. It is used in the calculation of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) chi-
square test of whether all predictor variables’ regression coefficients are 
simultaneously zero. Moreover, we provide the number of observations. This is 
the number of observations used in the Poisson regression. It may be less than 
the number of cases in the dataset if there are missing values for some variables 
in the model. By default, Stata and Eviews do a listwise deletion of incomplete 
cases. Besides, we also report Wald chi2 value, which is the LR test statistic for 
the omnibus test that at least one predictor variable regression coefficient is not 
equal to zero in the model. The degrees of freedom (the number in parenthesis) 
of the LR test statistic are defined by the number of predictor variables. Finally, 
“Prob>chi2” value indicates the probability of getting a LR test statistic as 
extreme as, or more so, than the one observed under the null hypothesis that all 
of the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. In other words, 
this is the probability of obtaining this chi-square test statistic if there is in fact 
no effect of the predictor variables. This p-value is compared to a specified alpha 
level, our willingness to accept a Type I error, which is typically set at 0.05 or 
0.01. The small p-value from the LR test, p < 0.0001, would lead us to conclude 
that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero. 
 
While analysing the estimated Poisson regression coefficients, we should keep in 
mind that the dependent variable is a count variable, and Poisson regression 
models the log of the expected count as a function of the predictor variables. We 
can interpret the Poisson regression coefficient as follows: for a one unit change 
in the predictor variable, the difference in the logs of expected counts is expected 
to change by the respective regression coefficient, given the other predictor 
variables in the model are held constant. For instance, the coefficient of the 
                                                            
4 Throughout the paper, model estimations are carried out and cross-checked by Stata 12.0 and 
Eviews 7.1. 




variable “Chairperson’s education level” can be interpreted as follows: If 
Chairperson’s education increases by one level (e.g. from MSc to PhD), the 
difference in the logs of expected counts would be expected to increase by 0.073 
unit, while holding the other variables in the model constant. 
 
The output table also presents the standard errors of the individual regression 
coefficients. They are used both in the calculation of the z test statistic and the 
confidence interval of the regression coefficient. P-value gives the probability 
that a particular z test statistic is as extreme as, or more so, than what has been 
observed under the null hypothesis that an individual predictor’s regression 
coefficient is zero given that the rest of the predictors are in the model. 
 
Since interpretation of coefficients from a Poisson regression is not 
straightforward, the incidence rate ratios (IRR) are obtained by exponentiating 
the Poisson regression coefficients. When we use IRR option, estimated 
coefficients are transformed to incidence-rate ratios, that is ie  rather than i . 
Standard errors and confidence intervals are similarly transformed. This option 
affects how results are displayed, not how they are estimated. As we discussed 
before, Poisson regression coefficients are interpreted as the difference between 
the log of expected counts. We also know that the difference of two logs is equal 
to the log of their quotient, log(a) – log(b) = log(a/b), and therefore, we could 
have also interpreted the parameter estimate as the log of the ratio of expected 
counts: this explains the “ratio” in incidence rate ratios. In addition, what we 
referred to as a count can also be called a rate. By definition a rate is the number 
of events per time (or space), which our response variable qualifies as. Hence, we 
could also interpret the Poisson regression coefficients as the log of the rate 
ratio: this explains the “rate” in incidence rate ratio. Finally, the rate at which 
events occur is called the incidence rate; thus we arrive at being able to interpret 
the coefficients in terms of incidence rate ratios. Table 3 shows Poisson 
estimation results as incident rate ratios. 
 




Table 2. Poisson regression estimation results 
 
Variables Variable Type Coefficient Robust Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Electricity market reform score Dependent 
      Chairperson of the regulator when reforms started/considered 
       His/her experience in electricity industry at appointment Explanatory 0.001 0.0039 0.35 0.730 -0.0063 0.0090 
Length of term Explanatory 0.019 0.0129 1.44 0.149 -0.0066 0.0438 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) Explanatory 0.073* 0.0442 1.65 0.098 -0.0136 0.1597 
Educational background in 
        - Business or economics Explanatory -0.186* 0.1106 -1.69 0.092 -0.4031 0.0303 
 - Engineering Explanatory 0.083 0.1085 0.76 0.447 -0.1301 0.2953 
 - Law Explanatory 0.002 0.1117 0.02 0.984 -0.2167 0.2213 
 - Other Explanatory 0.019 0.1389 0.14 0.891 -0.2532 0.2912 
Energy minister/governor when reforms started/considered 
       His/her experience in electricity industry Explanatory -0.007 0.0092 -0.80 0.424 -0.0253 0.0106 
Length of term Explanatory -0.001 0.0217 -0.05 0.963 -0.0436 0.0416 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) Explanatory 0.096* 0.0572 1.67 0.095 -0.0165 0.2077 
Educational background in 
        - Business or economics Explanatory -0.194* 0.1117 -1.74 0.083 -0.4129 0.0250 
 - Engineering Explanatory -0.339** 0.1624 -2.09 0.037 -0.6574 -0.0209 
 - Law Explanatory -0.154 0.1394 -1.10 0.270 -0.4273 0.1193 
 - Other Explanatory -0.275** 0.1160 -2.37 0.018 -0.5021 -0.0474 




Variables Variable Type Coefficient Robust Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Institutional variables 
       Investment freedom index in 2011 Explanatory 0.012*** 0.0043 2.87 0.004 0.0039 0.0207 
Polity score in 2010 Explanatory 0.045 0.0328 1.38 0.167 -0.0189 0.1097 
Corruption perceptions index in 2010 Explanatory 0.203*** 0.0772 2.63 0.008 0.0520 0.3546 
Property rights index in 2011 Explanatory -0.021*** 0.0062 -3.43 0.001 -0.0332 -0.0090 
Civil liberties score in 2011 Explanatory 0.281*** 0.1071 2.62 0.009 0.0711 0.4910 
Political rights score in 2011 Explanatory -0.148 0.0926 -1.59 0.111 -0.3290 0.0339 
Control variables 
       Log of population in 2010 Control 0.177*** 0.0330 5.37 0.000 0.1126 0.2421 
Log of GDP per capita in 2010 Control 0.315*** 0.0943 3.34 0.001 0.1300 0.4997 
Dummy (1: OECD country, 0: non-OECD country) Control -0.306* 0.1567 -1.95 0.051 -0.6134 0.0010 
Constant Constant -0.772 0.8297 -0.93 0.352 -2.3986 0.8539 
Note: Log pseudolikelihood: -173.87, Number of obs: 86 
         Wald chi2(23): 107.98, Prob > chi2: 0.000 
         Deviance goodness-of-fit: 48.87, Prob > chi2(62): 0.8876 
         Pearson goodness-of-fit: 48.28, Prob > chi2(62): 0.8989 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, 
 ** Significant at 5% level, 
  * Significant at 10% level. 
 




Table 3. Poisson regression estimation results as Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
 
Variables Variable Type IRR Robust Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Electricity market reform score Dependent 
      Chairperson of the regulator when reforms started/considered 
       His/her experience in electricity industry at appointment Explanatory 1.001 0.0039 0.35 0.730 0.9937 1.0091 
Length of term Explanatory 1.019 0.0131 1.44 0.149 0.9934 1.0447 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) Explanatory 1.076* 0.0475 1.65 0.098 0.9865 1.1731 
Educational background in 
 
      
 - Business or economics Explanatory 0.830* 0.0918 -1.69 0.092 0.6682 1.0307 
 - Engineering Explanatory 1.086 0.1179 0.76 0.447 0.8780 1.3435 
 - Law Explanatory 1.002 0.1120 0.02 0.984 0.8051 1.2477 
 - Other Explanatory 1.019 0.1415 0.14 0.891 0.7763 1.3380 
Energy minister/governor when reforms started/considered 
 
      
His/her experience in electricity industry Explanatory 0.993 0.0091 -0.80 0.424 0.9750 1.0107 
Length of term Explanatory 0.999 0.0217 -0.05 0.963 0.9573 1.0425 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) Explanatory 1.100* 0.0629 1.67 0.095 0.9836 1.2308 
Educational background in 
 
      
 - Business or economics Explanatory 0.824* 0.0920 -1.74 0.083 0.6617 1.0253 
 - Engineering Explanatory 0.712** 0.1157 -2.09 0.037 0.5182 0.9793 
 - Law Explanatory 0.857 0.1195 -1.10 0.270 0.6523 1.1267 
 - Other Explanatory 0.760** 0.0881 -2.37 0.018 0.6052 0.9537 




Variables Variable Type IRR Robust Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Institutional variables 
 
      
Investment freedom index in 2011 Explanatory 1.012*** 0.0043 2.87 0.004 1.0039 1.0210 
Polity score in 2010 Explanatory 1.046 0.0343 1.38 0.167 0.9812 1.1159 
Corruption perceptions index in 2010 Explanatory 1.225*** 0.0946 2.63 0.008 1.0534 1.4256 
Property rights index in 2011 Explanatory 0.979*** 0.0060 -3.43 0.001 0.9674 0.9910 
Civil liberties score in 2011 Explanatory 1.325*** 0.1419 2.62 0.009 1.0737 1.6339 
Political rights score in 2011 Explanatory 0.863 0.0799 -1.59 0.111 0.7196 1.0345 
Control variables 
 
      
Log of population in 2010 Control 1.194*** 0.0394 5.37 0.000 1.1192 1.2739 
Log of GDP per capita in 2010 Control 1.370*** 0.1292 3.34 0.001 1.1388 1.6482 
Dummy (1: OECD country, 0: non-OECD country) Control 0.736* 0.1154 -1.95 0.051 0.5415 1.0010 
Constant Constant 0.462 0.3833 -0.93 0.352 0.0908 2.3489 
Note: Log pseudolikelihood: -173.87, Number of obs: 86 
Wald chi2(23): 107.98, Prob > chi2: 0.000 
Deviance goodness-of-fit: 48.87, Prob > chi2(62): 0.8876 
Pearson goodness-of-fit: 48.28, Prob > chi2(62): 0.8989 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, 
 ** Significant at 5% level, 
   * Significant at 10% level. 
 
 




Having presented the study results let me interpret them in detail as follows. 
 
Results for the chairperson of electricity market regulatory agency when the 
reforms started or were considered: 
 
Our empirical findings suggest that the educational background and education 
level of the chairperson of the electricity market regulatory agency are two 
determinants of the scope of power industry reform in a country. We could not 
detect any statistically significant relationship between experience or length of 
term of the chairperson and scope of reforms. We find that if the chairperson’s 
education were to increase by one level (e.g. from MSc to PhD), its rate ratio for 
reform score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.076, while holding all 
other variables in the model constant. Besides, we detect a negative relationship 
between educational background of the chairperson in business or economics 
and scope of reforms. Our results imply that if the chairperson holds a degree in 
business or economics, the reform score is expected to decrease by a factor 
0.830, while holding all other variables in the model constant (see Table 3). 
 
Let me illustrate these results using data from our dataset. In 2004, South Africa 
started a reform process in its electricity market and set up its regulatory agency 
(National Energy Regulator, NERSA) and its first chair held an MSc degree. One 
year later, Nigeria also started a reform process and established its regulatory 
agency (Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, NERC) and its first chair 
had a PhD degree. For 2011, the electricity market reform scores of South Africa 
and Nigeria are 5 and 6, respectively. Our results suggest that if the chairperson’s 
education in a country were to increase by one level, its rate ratio for reform 
score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.076. Therefore, holding all 
other variables constant and assuming that two countries are the same apart 
from the education levels of chairpersons of their regulatory agencies when 
reforms started, our results require that South Africa’s reform score would be 
5.38 (5*1.076) if the education of the first chairperson of South Africa’s 
regulatory agency were to increase by 1 level (from MSc to PhD). So, our findings 
imply that 0.38 point of 1 point difference between the reform scores of two 




countries may be explained by the difference between education levels of two 
chairpersons. 
 
Results for the governor or minister responsible for energy policy when the reforms 
started or were considered: 
 
The educational background and education level of the governor or minister 
responsible for energy policy when the reforms started or were considered seem 
to be other important determinants of the scope of power industry reform in a 
country. We could not detect any statistically significant relationship between 
length of term or experience of the minister/governor and scope of reforms. Our 
findings show that if the minister/governor’s education were to increase by one 
level, its rate ratio for reform score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.1, 
while holding all other variables in the model constant. This result implies that a 
minister/governor’s education level positively contributes to the reform process. 
The results also show that if the minister/governor holds a degree in 
business/economics or engineering, reform score is expected to be 0.824 and 
0.712 times less, respectively (see Table 3). 
 
To illustrate these results, we may use data from our dataset. In 1996, 
Pennsylvania State of US considered whether to initiate a reform process. The 
Governor of Pennsylvania at that time held a non-engineering (law) university 
degree. Four years later, Kentucky State also considered the reforms in its 
electricity market and, at that time, the Governor of Kentucky had a degree in 
engineering. In 2011, the electricity market reform scores of Pennsylvania and 
Kentucky were 8 and 3, respectively. Our results suggest that if the governor 
holds a degree in engineering, reform score is expected to be 0.712 times less. 
Therefore, holding all other variables constant and assuming that two states are 
the same apart from educational background of the governors when the reforms 
were considered, our results require that reform score of Pennsylvania would be 
5.7 (8*0.712) if the Governor of Pennsylvania were to have an educational 
background in engineering. So, our findings imply that 2.3 (8-5.7) points of 5 




points difference between the reform scores of two states may be explained by 
the difference between educational backgrounds of two governors. 
 
Results for macro institutional variables: 
 
Most of the institutional variables in our analysis have a strong impact on the 
reform progress. 4 (out of 6) coefficients of institutional variables are significant 
even at 1% level. We find that reform progress is highly correlated with 
investment freedom index, corruption perceptions index, property rights index 
and civil liberties score. We could not detect a statistically meaningful 
relationship between reform score and polity score or political rights score. First 
of all, our findings suggest a positive relationship between investment freedom 
index and reform progress. If investment freedom index of a country were to 
increase by one unit, its rate ratio for reform score would be expected to increase 
by a factor 1.012, while holding all other variables in the model constant. 
Similarly, we see a positive relationship between reform progress and corruption 
perceptions index (which increases as corruption declines in a county). If 
corruption perceptions index of a country were to increase by one unit, its rate 
ratio for reform score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.225, while 
holding all other variables in the model constant. Moreover, we detect a negative 
relationship between property rights index and reform score. Although this 
negative relationship is statistically significant, its impact is extremely limited. If 
property rights index of a country were to increase by one unit, its rate ratio for 
reform score would be expected to decrease by a factor 0,979, while holding all 
other variables in the model constant. While evaluating these results, it is better 
to keep in mind that investment freedom index and property rights index are 
indicators based on a scale from 0 to 100, while corruption perceptions index 
ranges from 0 to 10. So, a one unit increase does not mean the same in all 
variables. The most unexpected result from our study is that any improvement in 
civil liberties score of a country results in a decline in reform score of that 
country. Civil liberties score ranges from 1 to 7, 1 representing the highest and 7 
the lowest level of freedom. If civil liberties score of a country were to increase 




by one unit (that is when civil liberties become more limited), its rate ratio for 
reform score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.325 (see Table 3). 
 
Results for control variables: 
 
Population and per capita income of a country seem to be other important 
factors in the reform progress. According to our results, population and GDP per 
capita of a country are positively correlated with its reform score. Moreover, 
being an OECD country has a significant negative impact on reform progress. If a 
country is a member of OECD, then the reform score in this country is expected 
to be 0.736 times less (see Table 3). This result may be regarded as an indication 
that in countries with well-established institutions the backgrounds of the 
chairpersons and the ministers/governors are much less important than in those 
with weaker institutions in terms of reform progress.  
 
To illustrate the results above, we again use data from our dataset. Malaysia and 
Australia started a reform process in their electricity markets in 2001 and 2005, 
respectively. Malaysia is a non-OECD country with an investment freedom index 
score of 45 in 2011. On the other hand, Australia is an OECD country and its 
investment freedom index score is 80 for 2011. For 2011, the electricity market 
reform scores of Malaysia and Australia are 6 and 8, respectively. Our results 
suggest that if a country is a member of OECD, reform score is expected to be 
0.736 times smaller. Similarly, our findings imply that if investment freedom 
index of a country were to increase by one unit, its rate ratio for reform score 
would be expected to increase by a factor 1.012. Therefore, holding all other 
variables constant and assuming that two countries are the same apart from 
their OECD membership status and investment freedom index scores, our results 
require that Malaysia’s reform score would be 6.7 [6*0.736*1.012(80-45)] if 
Malaysia were to be an OECD country and its investment freedom index score 
were to be equal to that of Australia (i.e. 80). So, our findings imply that 0.7 
points of 2 points difference between the reform scores of two countries may be 
explained by OECD membership status and investment freedom index score. 
 




In our analysis above, we used observations from countries together with those 
from the states in US and Canada. Although the states in US and Canada are 
usually free to decide whether to initiate a reform process in their power 
industries, their discretion may be restricted by the central government in some 
instances. Besides, the states in US and Canada are similar in terms of their 
geographical location (i.e. North America) and income level (i.e. high income 
group), which implies that they may have common tendencies towards 
electricity market reform. Taking into account also the fact that the observations 
from the states in US and Canada constitute more than half of the observations in 
our dataset, our results may be dominated by common characteristics of the 
states in US and Canada that may or may not be relevant to reform process. 
Therefore, re-estimating our models without the states in US and Canada may 
produce useful insights for our analysis. In this second phase of estimation, we 
look at micro and macro institutional determinants of the reform progress 
separately. Table 4 presents Poisson regression estimation results without the 
states in US and Canada as Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) for micro institutional 
determinants of the reform progress while Table 5 does the same for macro 
determinants. In Table 6, we replace “civil liberties score” with “political rights 
score” and estimate the model again. 
 
The empirical findings from the second phase of estimation suggest that the 
length of term and educational background of the chairperson of the electricity 
market regulatory agency are two determinants of the scope of power industry 
reform in a country. We could not detect any statistically significant relationship 
between experience in electricity industry or education level of the chairperson 
and scope of reforms in a country. We find that if the chairperson’s length of 
term in a country were to increase by one year, its rate ratio for reform score 
would be expected to increase by a factor 1.042, while holding all other variables 
in the model constant. Moreover, we detect a positive relationship between 
educational background of the chairperson in engineering and law and scope of 
reforms in a country. Our results imply that if the chairperson holds a degree in 
engineering or law, the reform score is expected to be 1.459 or 1.477 times 
greater, respectively; while holding all other variables in the model constant. 





Experience of the minister responsible for energy policy and his/her educational 
background seem to be other important determinants of the scope of power 
industry reform in a country. We could not detect any statistically significant 
relationship between length of term or education level of the minister and scope 
of reforms. Our findings show that if the minister’s experience in electricity 
industry were to increase by one year, its rate ratio for reform score would be 
expected to decrease by a factor 0.978, while holding all other variables in the 
model constant. This result implies that minister’s experience in electricity 
industry adversely affects the reform process. The results also show that if the 
minister holds a degree in economics or business, reform score in this country is 
expected to be 1.601 times greater. However, if s/he holds a degree in law, then 
the reform score in this country is expected to be 0.737 times smaller. 
 
Table 4. Poisson regression estimation results without the states in US and 










Electricity market reform score Dependent 
   
Chairperson of the regulator when reforms started/considered 
His/her experience in electricity industry at 
appointment 
Explanatory 
1.007 0.007 0.351 
Length of term Explanatory 1.042** 0.021 0.044 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) Explanatory 1.120 0.133 0.338 
Educational background in 
 
   
- Business or economics Explanatory 0.946 0.165 0.752 
- Engineering Explanatory 1.459* 0.313 0.078 
- Law Explanatory 1.477** 0.228 0.011 
Energy minister when reforms started/considered 
His/her experience in electricity industry Explanatory 0.978** 0.011 0.038 
Length of term Explanatory 0.998 0.045 0.963 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) Explanatory 1.012 0.095 0.900 
Educational background in 
 
   
- Business or economics Explanatory 1.601*** 0.252 0.003 












- Engineering Explanatory 1.403 0.333 0.154 
- Law Explanatory 0.737* 0.127 0.077 
Control variables 
Population in 2010 (million people) Control 1.001*** 0.000 0.000 
Dummy (1: OECD country, 0: non-OECD 
country) 
Control 
1.471** 0.269 0.035 
Polity score in 2010 [-10, +10] Control 1.090*** 0.034 0.006 
Note: Log pseudolikelihood: -78.25, Number of obs: 35 
Wald chi2(15): 3384.83, Prob > chi2: 0.000 
Deviance goodness-of-fit: 26.42, Prob > chi2(19): 0.1188 
Pearson goodness-of-fit: 27.68, Prob > chi2(19): 0.0898 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, 
 ** Significant at 5% level, 
   * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 5. Poisson regression estimation results without the states in US and 










Electricity market reform score Dependent 
   
Institutional variables 
Legal system & property rights index in 2009 Explanatory 1.119*** 0.024 0.000 
Polity score in 2010 Explanatory 1.036*** 0.011 0.001 
Investment freedom index in 2011 Explanatory 1.007*** 0.002 0.002 
Civil liberties score in 2011 Explanatory 1.129*** 0.024 0.000 
Control variable 
Log of population in 2010 Control 1.062*** 0.023 0.005 
Note: Log pseudolikelihood: -99.73, Number of obs: 49 
Wald chi2(5): 5381.81, Prob > chi2: 0.000 
Deviance goodness-of-fit: 16.84, Prob > chi2(43): 0.9999 
Pearson goodness-of-fit: 16.00, Prob > chi2(43): 0.9999 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, 
 ** Significant at 5% level, 
   * Significant at 10% level. 
 




Table 6. Poisson regression estimation results without the states in US and 










Electricity market reform score Dependent 
   
Institutional variables 
Legal system & property rights index in 2009 Explanatory 1.100*** 0.025 0.000 
Polity score in 2010 Explanatory 1.042*** 0.013 0.001 
Investment freedom index in 2011 Explanatory 1.008*** 0.002 0.000 
Political rights score in 2011 Explanatory 1.107*** 0.020 0.000 
Control variable 
Log of population in 2010 Control 1.080*** 0.020 0.000 
Note: Log pseudolikelihood: -100.07, Number of obs: 49 
Wald chi2(5): 5028.85, Prob > chi2: 0.000 
Deviance goodness-of-fit: 17.51, Prob > chi2(43): 0.9998 
Pearson goodness-of-fit: 16.64, Prob > chi2(43): 0.9999 
 
*** Significant at 1% level, 
 ** Significant at 5% level, 
   * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Population of a country seems to be an important factor in the reform progress 
but its impact is quite limited. According to our results, if the population of a 
country were to increase by one million, its rate ratio for reform score would be 
expected to increase by a factor 1.001, while holding all other variables in the 
model constant. Being an OECD country has also a significant positive impact on 
reform progress. If a country is a member of OECD, then the reform score in this 
country is expected to be 1.471 times greater. This result may be regarded as an 
indication that in countries with well-established institutions the backgrounds of 
the chairpersons and the ministers are much less important than in those with 
weaker institutions in terms of reform progress. 
 
The results from the models for macro determinants of reform progress confirm 
that all institutional variables have a strong impact on the reform progress. All 
coefficients are significant even at 1% level (see Table 5 and Table 6). We find a 
positive relationship between legal system and property rights index and reform 
progress in a country. If legal system and property rights index of a country were 




to increase by one unit, its rate ratio for reform score would be expected to 
increase by a factor 1.119, while holding all other variables in the model constant 
(see Table 5). Similarly, we see a positive relationship between reform progress 
and polity score and investment freedom index. If polity score or investment 
freedom index of a country were to increase by one unit, its rate ratio for reform 
score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.036 or 1.007 respectively, 
while holding all other variables in the model constant. While evaluating these 
results, it is better to keep in mind that polity score is an indicator based on a 
scale from -10 to +10, while investment freedom index ranges from 0 to 100. So, 
a one unit increase in these variables does not mean the same. 
 
As in the case of the first phase of estimations, the results from the second phase 
verify that any improvement in civil liberties or political rights score of a country 
results in a decline in reform score of that country. As mentioned before, civil 
liberties score and political rights score range from 1 to 7, 1 representing the 
highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. If civil liberties score of a country were 
to increase by one unit (that is when civil liberties become more limited), its rate 
ratio for reform score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.129 (see Table 
5). In the same way, if the political rights score of a country were to increase by 
one unit (that is when political rights become more limited), its rate ratio for 
reform score would be expected to increase by a factor 1.107 (see Table 6). 
 
Table 7 compares the results from the first and second phase of estimations. It 
presents statistically significant coefficients only. As can be seen in Table 7, the 
results from two groups of estimations are similar in general with some slight 
differences in details. In both groups of estimations, we see that characteristics of 
chairperson and minister/governor and institutional variables have a 
statistically significant impact on reform progress. 
 
To sum up, based on our results, we reject Hypotheses 2 and 3 but fail to reject 
Hypotheses 1 and 4. Our results clearly show that both the background of the 
chairperson and the minister/governor and institutional endowments are 
important determinants of how far reforms have gone in a country. It should also 




be noted that any improvement in the investment environment positively 
contributes to the scope of reforms in a country. On the other hand, there seems 
to be a negative relationship between reform progress and civil liberties, which 
may prove that reforms may be limited in countries with strong civil society 
institutions such as trade unions or other organized structures in the society that 
may consider reforms as ‘harmful’ to their self-interest. 
 
Table 7. Results with and without the states in US and Canada as IRR 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(with the states in  
US and Canada) 
Coefficient 
(without the states in  
US and Canada) 
Electricity market reform score 
  Chairperson of the regulator when reforms started/considered 
His/her experience in electricity industry at appointment   
Length of term  1.042** 
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) 1.076*  
Educational background in   
 - Business or economics 0.830*  
 - Engineering  1.459* 
 - Law  1.477** 
 - Other   
Energy minister/governor when reforms started/considered 
His/her experience in electricity industry  0.978** 
Length of term   
Education level (1: BSc, 2: MSc, 3: PhD) 1.100*  
Educational background in   
 - Business or economics 0.824* 1.601*** 
 - Engineering 0.712**  
 - Law  0.737* 
 - Other 0.760**  
Institutional variables 
Investment freedom index in 2011 1.012*** 1.007*** 
Polity score in 2010  1.036*** 
Corruption perceptions index in 2010 1.225***  
Property rights index in 2011 0.979***  
Civil liberties score in 2011 1.325*** 1.129*** 
Political rights score in 2011  1.107*** 






(with the states in  
US and Canada) 
Coefficient 
(without the states in  
US and Canada) 
Legal system & property rights index in 2009  1.119*** 
Control variables 
Log of population in 2010 1.194*** 1.062*** 
Log of GDP per capita in 2010 1.370***  
Dummy (1: OECD country, 0: non-OECD country) 0.736* 1.471** 
Constant   
*** Significant at 1% level, 
 ** Significant at 5% level, 




Electricity is an indispensable good for households and a key input for industry 
in almost every economy. The three decades of electricity liberalization so far 
have taken place in line with a general trend towards liberalization of the 
economy in general and the energy industry in particular. In this process, the 
extent of reforms has been largely determined by country specific local 
conditions (e.g. development stage of the country, demand for electricity, cross-
subsidy policy and so on), quality of institutions required for the reform and 
political preferences related to the reform agenda. Today, the direct benefits of 
the reforms to households are still not directly visible in many reforming 
countries, which underlines the need for further analyses of the reforms. This 
paper contributes to efforts to analyse electricity market reforms with an applied 
macro level cross-country approach. 
 
This study offered both a macro and micro level econometric analysis on the 
possible institutional determinants of the electricity market reform progress. 
Throughout the study, we tried to explain whether differences in institutional 
structures of countries play an important role in explaining how far reforms have 
gone in these countries; how specific institutional endowments of a country 
affect its reform performance and, finally, whether the background of the 
chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms started or were considered 




or that of the governor/minister responsible for energy policy at that time has an 
impact on reform progress. We focused on these issues by using an empirical 
econometric model to observe the impact of institutional variables on the reform 
progress. Cross-section data from 51 states in US, 13 states in Canada and 51 
other countries were employed. As a result of the study, we found that both the 
background of the chairperson and the minister/governor and institutional 
endowments of a country are important determinants of how far reforms have 
gone in a country. Our results imply that any improvement in the investment 
environment positively contributes to the scope of reforms in a country. On the 
other hand, there seems to be a negative relationship between reform progress 
and civil liberties, which indicates that democracy may delay or hinder the 
reforms by magnifying the voices of anti-reform interest groups. 
 
We hope that future research will continue developing econometric models to 
analyse electricity market reforms. We suggest the following for future research. 
First of all, due to lack of essential data, we focused on the reform progress 
rather than reform success or failure. However, there is a definite need for 
identifying the determinants of reform success or failure. So, future research on 
electricity market reforms should focus on identifying what successful reform is 
and developing new variables that measure the relative success of reforms.  
 
The second possible extension in future research may be the identification of 
suitable instrumental variables (IV) to overcome the possible endogeneity 
problem. Despite our efforts, we could not find any suitable instrumental 
variable in this research and, therefore, did not use IV methods in the paper. As 
we know credibility of the estimates from a regression using IV methods hinges 
on the selection of suitable instruments. Utilization of IV methods with 
inappropriate instruments creates more problems than it solves. If suitable 
instrumental variables exist for the analysis of electricity market reforms and 
they are used in the future research, our understanding of the reforms may 
improve. 
 




The third task for future research should be the extension of the data set in terms 
of number of countries, time period, frequency of data and number (and quality) 
of variables. In this paper, we employed data from 53 countries. There may be 
sample selection bias if the countries making this data available have differing 
results for the dependent variables than those which do not make data available. 
Besides, due to lack of data, we could not properly account for the impact of 
some other variables on reform progress in our analysis. Future research should 
focus on developing techniques to overcome data-related problems.  
 
The fourth extension may be realized by taking into account the fact that 
electricity reform is a part of wider economic reform (or liberalization) in 
general and energy industry reform in particular. In the period 1990-2011, total 
private investments in the infrastructure industries (energy, telecom, transport, 
water and sewerage) were about $1,695 billion. Out of this figure, $573 billion 
(33.8%) went to energy industry in general and $508 billion (30%) to electricity 
industry in particular. Power market reform affects and is affected by reforms in 
other energy and non-energy sectors. For instance, it is obvious that the progress 
in telecommunication reform has facilitated electricity reform, which in turn has 
contributed to the progress in gas market reform. As observed by Pollitt (2009), 
the link between electricity reform and institutions more generally remains 
poorly explored. Electricity reform, Pollitt (2009) argues, requires fundamental 
change of the institutions in the electricity sector (e.g. the creation of an 
independent regulator and an Independent System Operator); however, these 
institutional changes occur in the context of ‘deeper’ institutions such as 
competition policy, the judiciary, political fora, and so on. The extent to which 
electricity reform can make up for deficiencies in these ‘deeper’ institutions is 
limited. Moreover, Nepal and Jamasb (2012) investigate the link between power 
sector reforms and wider institutional reforms in the economy across different 
groups of transition countries. Their results indicate that power sector reform is 
highly inter-dependent with wider reforms in other sectors of the economy and 
failure to harmonize inter-sector reforms leads to power sector reform measures 
being ineffective. They argue that the success of power sector reforms in 
developing countries largely depend on the extent to which they synchronize 




inter-sector reforms in the economy. In this research, we did not take into 
account possible spill-over effects from or to other energy and non-energy 
sectors but inter-reform relationship is clearly an important research area that is 
open to exploration. 
 
Finally, we studied certain aspects of institutional quality. Of course, there 
remain many other characteristics of institutions that we did not investigate. 
They may constitute possible topics for future research if data on them become 
available. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of previous econometric studies adopting a NIE approach 
 
Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
 Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) 
H: Settler mortality affected 
settlements; settlements 
affected early institutions; 
and early institutions 
persisted and formed the 
basis of current institutions. 
- Log GDP per capita (PPP) 
in 1995 
- Log output per worker in 
1988 
 
- Average protection against 
expropriation risk, 1985-1995 
- Constraint on executive in 
1990 
- Constraint on executive in 
1900 
- Constraint on executive in 
first year of independence 
- Democracy in 1900 
- European settlements in 
1900 
- Log of European settler 
mortality 
- Continent dummies 
- Latitude 
- Malaria in 1994 
- Life expectancy 
- Infant mortality 
- Mean temperature 
- Distance from coast 
- Yellow fever dummy 
By exploiting differences in 
European mortality rates as 
an instrument for current 
institutions, large effects of 
institutions on income per 
capita are estimated. Once the 
effect of institutions is 
controlled for, countries in 
Africa or those closer to the 
equator do not have lower 
incomes. 
Data Sources: World 
Bank, Political Risk 
Services, National 
Bureau of Economic 




estimation,  two-stage 
least-squares 
estimation 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Acemoglu et al. 
(2008) 
H: There is a negative 
correlation between 
economic inequality and 
long-run economic 
development. 
- Secondary school 
enrolment 
- Primary school 
enrolment 
- Urbanization (1993) 
- Unsatisfied basic needs 
- Literacy rate (1937) 
- Urbanization (1937) 
- Share of buildings 
without access to public 
services 
 
- Land Gini 
- Contemporary land Gini 
- Political concentration index 
- Year of foundation of a 
municipality 
- Altitude of the municipality 
- Distance of the municipality 
to Bogota (the capital) 
- Area 
- Average rainfall 
- While the distribution of 
landed wealth in 
Cundinamarca was 
considerably more unequal 
than in northern U.S. states, it 
was less unequal than in the 
U.S. South. 
- There is a negative 
association between land 
inequality (land Gini) and 
political concentration across 
municipalities in 
Cundinamarca. 
- Land Gini (economic 
inequality) is positively 
associated with good 
outcomes. 
- There is a fairly robust 
negative relationship between 
political concentration 
(measure of political 
inequality) and good 
economic outcomes. 
Data: 
- Data on economic 
inequality in nineteenth 
century Cundinamarca 
are from  the cadastral 
(land census) data 
collected by the state of 
Cundinamarca in 1879 
and 1890 
- Data on politicians 
(mayors) are from the 




- The contemporary 
data are from the 1993 
population census and 
the Colombian 
statistical agency DANE 
- Location and rainfall 
data from Instituto 
Geografico Agustin 
Codazzi in Bogota 
Methodology:  
- Cross-sectional 
ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimations 
- Quantile regression 
estimation 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Aghion et al. (2008) H: Democracy enhances 
economic growth. 
- 10 year output growth 
rate by sector 
- 10  year value-added 
growth rate by sector 
- 10 year employment 
growth rate by sector 
- Democracy 
- The distance to the 
technological frontier 
- Log of GDP per capita 
- Executive de facto 
independence 
- Constraints on executive 
power 
- Effectiveness of legislature 
- Government effectiveness 
- Competition in the legislative 
nominating process 
- Autocracy 
- Political rights average 1972-
99 
- Civil rights average 1972-99 
- Democratic institutions and 
political rights enhance 
growth of more advanced 
sectors. 
- An important channel of this 
effect is freedom of entry in 
markets. Political rights are 
associated with freedom of 
entry, and the latter is 
especially important for 
sectors close to the 
technological frontier. 
- More advanced economies 
benefit more from democratic 
institutions and therefore the 
demand for democracy should 
increase with the level of per 
capita income in a country. 
Data: 
- Industry employment 
and value-added data 
from the Industrial 
Statistics Database 
collected by the UNIDO 
(for 180 countries for 
the period 1963 to 
2003) 
- Polity IV database and 
the Freedom House 
measures of civil 
liberties and political 
rights 




Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) 
H: An economy’s initial 
configuration of resources 
shapes the political struggle 
for income and wealth 
distribution, and this in turn 
affects long-run growth. 
- Average per capita 
growth rate over 1960-
1985 
- Average per capita 
growth rate over 1970-
1985 
- Gini coefficient of income 
inequality 
- Gini coefficient of land 
distribution inequality 
- Per capita GDP level in 1960 
- Primary school enrolment 
- There will be a strong 
demand for redistribution in 
societies where a large section 
of the population does not 
have access to the productive 
resources of the economy. 
Data: 
- Cover 35 countries for 
1960-85 period 
- Heston and Summers 
dataset 
- Barro and Wolf 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
ratio in 1960 
- Dummy variable for 
democratic governments 
Such conflict over distribution 
will generally harm growth. 
- The greater the inequality of 
wealth and income, the higher 
the rate of taxation, and the 
lower growth. 
- Inequality in land and 
income ownership is 
negatively correlated with 




Alesina et al. (1996) H1: There is a general 
correlation between 
economic growth and 
political stability. 
H2: Political stability fosters 
economic growth, and  low 
economic growth leads to 
political instability. 
- Annual rate of growth of 
per capita GDP 
- Government change 




- Executive adjustments 
- Number of unsuccessful 
attempts at changing the 
government 
- Log of real per capita GDP 
- World business cycle 
- Percentage of school age 
population enrolled in 
primary school 
- Dummy variable for 
countries in South American 
and Latin America 
- Dummy variable for 
- In countries and time 
periods with a high degree of 
political instability, growth is 
significantly lower than 
otherwise.  
- The effect of growth on 
political instability is less 
clear: the effect of low 
economic growth on 
government collapses is 
strong for coups d’état but 
much less clear for other 
types of government change. 
- The occurrence of 
Data: 
- Cover 113 countries 
for 1950-1982 period 
- Summers and Heston 
dataset 
- Jodice and Taylor 
dataset 
- World Bank Economic 








Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
countries in Africa 
- Dummy variable for 
industrial countries 
government changes in the 
recent past increases the 
probability of observing 
future collapses. 
Assane and Grammy 
(2003) 
H: The “quality” of the 
institutional framework 
positively affects economic 
development. 
- Level of income, 1985 - Physical capital formation 
- Labour force growth 
- Human capital formation 
- Economic freedom 
- Institutional efficiency 







- “Good” institutions improve 
efficiency and accelerate 
growth. 
- The positive effect of 
institutional “quality” is more 
pronounced with mutually 
reinforcing support of 
economic freedom.  
- “Good” institutions help 
developing countries grow 
faster to achieve conditional 
convergence. 
- Economic development 
requires not only physical and 
human capital formation, but 
also freedom to choose and 
institutional support. 
Data: 
- Cover 110 countries 
- Business International 
Corporation 
- Human development 
index 





Barro  (1996) 
 
H: Economic freedoms, in 
the form of free markets and 
small governments that 
- Growth rate of real per 
capita GDP over 1965-75 
period 
- Log of GDP 
- Male schooling 
- Female schooling 
- The favourable effects on 
growth include maintenance 
of the rule of law, free 
Data:  
- Summers-Heston data 
set 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
focus on the maintenance of 
property rights, encourage 
economic growth. 
- Growth rate of real per 
capita GDP over 1975-85 
period 
- Growth rate of real per 
capita GDP over 1985-90 
period 
- Log of life expectancy 
- Log of GDP x human capital 
- Log of fertility rate 
- Government consumption 
ratio 
- Public educational spending 
ratio 
- Black-market premium 
- Rule-of-law index 
- Terms-of-trade change 
- Investment ratio 
- Democracy index 
- Democracy index squared 
- Democracy index dummy 
markets, small government 
consumption, and high human 
capital. 
- Once these kinds of variables 
and the initial level of real per 
capita GDP are held constant, 
the overall effect of 
democracy on growth is 
weakly negative. 
- There is a suggestion of a 
nonlinear relationship in 
which more democracy 
enhances growth at low levels 
of political freedom but 
depresses growth when a 
moderate level of freedom has 
already been attained.  
- Improvements in the 
standard of living—measured 
by GDP, health status, and 
education—substantially 
raise the probability that 
political freedoms will grow. 
- World Bank 









- OLS estimation 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Barro  (2000) H: Income inequality has an 
effect on macroeconomic 
performance, as reflected in 
rates of economic growth 
and investment. 
- Average growth rate 
(1965 to 1975) 
- Average growth rate 
(1975 to 1985) 
- Average growth rate 
(1985 to 1995) 
- Ratio of real investment 
to real GDP 
- Log of per capita GDP 




- Rule-of-law index 
- Democracy index 
- Democracy index squared 
- Inflation rate 
- Years of schooling 
- Log of total fertility rate 
- Investment/GDP 
- Growth rate of terms of trade 
- Evidence from a broad panel 
of countries shows little 
overall relation between 
income inequality and rates of 
growth and investment. 
- For growth, higher 
inequality tends to retard 
growth in poor countries and 
encourage growth in richer 
places. 
- The Kuznets curve—
whereby inequality first 
increases and later decreases 
during the process of 
economic development—
emerges as a clear empirical 
regularity. However, this 
relation does not explain the 
bulk of variations in 
inequality across countries or 
over time. 
Data: 





- Panel estimation 
(fixed effects model) 
 
Barro (1991) H: There are some empirical 
regularities about growth, 
fertility, and investment. 
- Per capita GDP growth 
- Investment 
- School-enrolment rates at 
the secondary levels in 1960 
- School-enrolment rates at 
- The growth rate of real per 
capita GDP is positively 
related to initial human 
Data: 
- Cover 98 countries in 
the period 1960-1985 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
the primary levels in 1960 
- GDP per capita in 1960 
- The number of revolutions 
and coups per year 
- The number per million 
population of political 
assassinations per year 
- Mortality rates for children 
aged 0-4 
- Student-teacher ratio 
- Adult literacy rate 
- The total fertility rate 
- Dummy variables for Africa 
and Latin America 
capital (proxied by school-
enrolment rates) and 
negatively related to the 
initial level of real per capita 
GDP.  
- Countries with higher 
human capital have lower 
fertility rates and higher 
ratios of physical investment 
to GDP. 
- Growth is inversely related 
to the share of government 
consumption in GDP, but 
insignificantly related to the 
share of public investment. 
- Growth rates are positively 
related to measures of 
political stability and 
inversely related to a proxy 
for market distortions. 
- Summers and Heston 
dataset 
- United Nations 





Kudamatsu  (2008) 
H1: Autocratic regimes do 
not always perform badly, at 
least as judged by economic 
indicators, such as the 
- Life expectancy 
- Gross primary school 
enrolment ratio 
- Economic growth 
- Per capita income 
- Ethnic fractionalization 
- European settlers’ mortality 
- French legal origin 
- Democracies can be better or 
worse than autocracies in 
terms of accountability. 
- Successful autocracies are 
Data: 
- World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
- UNESCO Institute for 
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growth rate of income per 
capita or other components 
of the human development 
index. 
H2: Given that democracy 
per se does not guarantee 
good economic performance, 
some features of autocratic 
regimes may be conducive to 
good economic performance. 
- Socialist legal origin 
- German legal origin 
- Oil price boom 
- Decade dummies 
- Region dummies 
- Number of leadership 
changes per year 
those where poor-quality 
leadership leads to removal of 
leaders from office. 
- The forces shaping 
leadership replacement may 
be at work in successful 
autocracies. Leadership 
turnover is greater in 






Caselli et al. (1996) H: There are two sources of 
inconsistency in existing 
cross-country empirical 
work on growth: correlated 
individual effects and 
endogenous explanatory 
variables. 
- Change in growth rate - GDP per capita in previous 
year 
- Male education 





- Life expectancy 
- Assassinations 
- Terms of trade 
- Per capita incomes converge 
to their steady-state levels at 
a rate of approximately 10 
percent per year. This result 
stands in sharp contrast to the 
current consensus, which 
places the convergence rate at 
2 percent. 
- The results reject both the 
standard and the augmented 
version of the Solow model. 
Data: 
- Maddison dataset 
- Summers and Heston 
dataset 
Methodology: 
- Regressions using a 
generalized method of 
moments estimator. 
Clague et al. (1996) 
 
H1: Any incentive an 
autocrat has to respect 
property and contract rights 
- ICRG index 
- BERI index 
- Credit risk 
- The number of consecutive 
years that a country has been 
a democracy 
- There is a compelling 
empirical relationship 
between property and 
Data: 
- The Gurr and Banks 
database (1986-90) 
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comes from his interest in 
future tax collections and 
national income and 
increases with his planning 
horizon. 
H2: In autocracies it is the 
time horizon of the 
individual autocrat (or 
occasionally the ruling 
clique) that is the main 
determinant of property and 
contract rights, whereas in 
democracies these rights 
depend upon whether the 
democratic system is 
durable. 
- Currency depreciation 
- Black market exchange 
premium 
 
- The number of years that the 
chief executive has been in 
office in a democracy 
- The number of consecutive 
years that the chief executive 
in an autocratic nation has 
been in power 
- The duration of the ruling 
group 
- The amount of contract-
intensive money 
- Indexes from two firms 
evaluating risks to foreign 
investors 
- Credit rating variable 
- The rate of currency 
depreciation 
- Per capita income 
contract rights and an 
autocrat’s time in power.  
- Autocrats who had been in 
power longer and who had 
reason to have longer time 
horizons were associated with 
better property and contract 
rights than autocrats who 
were in power only for a 
shorter time. 
- In general, democracies 
provide greater security of 
property and contractual 
rights than autocracies. But 
these benefits of democracy 
did not appear quickly: the 
property and contract rights 
were often poor in 
democracies that had lasted 
only a short time. 
- Gastil indexes 
- Europa Yearbook 
- The International 
Country Risk Guide 





published since 1972 





Drury et al. (2006) H: One of democracy’s 
indirect benefits is its ability 
to mitigate the detrimental 
effect of corruption on 
- Growth of GDP - Level of corruption 
- Life expectancy 
- Trade openness 
- Population growth 
- Corruption has no significant 
effect on economic growth in 
democracies, while non-
democracies suffer significant 
Data: 
- Time-series cross-
section data for more 
than 100 countries 
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economic growth. - Log of GDP per capita 
- Tropical climate 
- Government spending 
economic harm from 
corruption. 
from 1982 to 1997 
- World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
(2003) 
- International Country 




- Polity IV database 
- Freedom House 
measure of democracy 
Methodology: OLS 
estimation 
Easterly and Levine 
(1997) 
H1: Higher levels of ethnic 
diversity encourage poor 
policies, poor education, 
political instability, 
inadequate infrastructure, 
and other factors associated 
with slow growth. 
H2: There is a direct effect of 
ethnic diversity on economic 
growth and an indirect effect 
- Average annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita in 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s 
 
- Initial income 
- Ethnolinguistic diversity 
- School attainment 
- Political stability 
- Financial development 
- Black market premium 
- Fiscal surplus 
- Infrastructure development 
- Dummy variables for Africa 
and Latin America 
- Low school attainment, 
political instability, poorly 
developed financial systems, 
large black market exchange 
rate premiums, large 
government deficits, and 
inadequate infrastructure are 
significantly correlated with 
economic growth. 
Data: 
- Barro and Lee dataset 
- World Bank 
- IMF 
- Pick’s Currency 
Yearbook 
- Political Risk Services 
- World Resources 
Institute 
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of ethnic diversity on public 
policy choices that influence 
long-run growth rates. 
- Assassinations 
- Financial depth 
- Fiscal surplus/GDP 
Methodology: 
- Technique of 
seemingly unrelated 
regressions 
Helliwell (1994) H: There are two-way 
linkages between democracy 
and economic growth. 
- Growth in real GDP per 
adult from 1960 to 1985 
- Bollen democracy index 
- Real GDP per adult in 1960 
- Investment rate 
- Schooling rate 
 
- The effects of income on 
democracy are found to be 
robust and positive. 
- It is still not possible to 
identify any systematic net 
effects of democracy on 
subsequent economic growth. 
Data: 
- Cross-sectional and 
pooled data for up to 
125 countries over the 
period from 1960 to 
1985 
- Bollen index for 1960 
- Gastil index for 1976 
and 1985 
- World Bank 
Methodology: OLS 
estimation 
Isham et al. (1997) H: There is a link between 
civil liberties and democracy 
- critical determinants of 
how governments exercise 
public decisions and 
authority - and the efficacy 
of public investments. 
- Economic rate of return 
of government projects 
- The probability of a 
project being rated 
satisfactory 
- Freedom House civil 
liberties, 1978-87 
- Humana, 1982-85 
- Media pluralism, 1983-87 
- Freedom to organize, 1983-
87 
- There is a strong empirical 
link between civil liberties 
and the performance of 
government projects. 
- Even after controlling for 
other determinants of 
performance, countries with 
the strongest civil liberties 
Data: 
- World Bank’s 
Operations Evaluation 
Department 
- Freedom House’s civil 
liberties index 
- UN’s Humana index 
Methodology: OLS and 
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have projects with an 
economic rate of return 8-22 
percentage points higher than 
countries with the weakest 
civil liberties. 
- The strong effect of civil 
liberties holds true even when 




Keefer and Knack 
(1997) 
H: Poor countries are falling 
back rather than catching up 
with wealthy countries. 
Deficient institutions 
underlie this divergence. 
- Average real per capita 
growth in GDP, 1960-1989 
- GDP/Capita, 1960 
- Country Risk Index 
- Business Risk Index 
- Executive Constraints 
- Primary School Enrolment 
- Secondary School Enrolment 
- Labour Force Growth 
- Price Changes 
- Income Gap 
- Institutional Variable 
- Institution x Income Gap 
- The ability of poor countries 
to catch up is determined in 
large part by the institutional 
environment in which 
economic activity in these 
countries takes place. 
- Institutions are powerful 
determinants of the ability of 
countries to benefit from the 
“catch-up” effect. While 
poorer countries may have 
advantages because of low-
cost access to advanced 
technology or the diminishing 
returns experienced by 
Data: 
- International Country 
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wealthier countries, these 
potential advantages appear 
to be squandered in countries 
with poor institutional 
frameworks. 
P. Keefer and Knack 
(2002) 
H: Social polarization 
reduces the security of 
property and contract rights 
and, through this channel, 
reduces growth. 
- International Country 
Risk Guide Index (ICRG), 
1986–95 
- Annual growth in per 
capita income over the 
1970–92 period 
- Ethnic tensions (0-6 scale) 
- The percent of a country’s 
population belonging to the 
largest ethnic group 
- Log of 1985 GDP per capita 
- Per capita growth, 1980-85 
- Aggregate GDP, 1985 
- Gini: income inequality 
- Gini: land inequality 
- Ethnic homogeneity 
- Political violence 
- Regime type 
- Continent dummy 
- Log of 1970 GDP per capita 
- Mean years of education, 
1970 
- Property rights index, 1982 
- Polarization makes large 
changes in current policies, 
including those guaranteeing 
the security of contract and 
property rights, more likely 
under a wide range of 
institutional arrangements. 
- Social polarization may 
directly undermine the 
security of rights. 
- If the insecurity of property 
rights slows growth in 
unequal or otherwise 
polarized societies, then 
governments that commit 
over the long-run to 
particular redistributive 
policies incur less risk of 
slowing economic growth. 
Data: 
- International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), 
published by Political 
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Knack and Keefer 
(1997) 
H: Trust and civic norms 
have an influence on growth 
and investment rates. 
- Average annual growth in 
per capita income over the 
1980-1992 period for 29 
countries 
- Log of output/worker 
- Log of capital/worker 
- School/worker 
- Log of total factor 
productivity 
- TRUST (the percentage of 
respondents in each nation 
replying “most people can be 
trusted”) 
- CIVIC (the strength of civic 
norms) 
- Per capita GDP in 1980 
- Labour force growth 
- (Exports + Imports )/GDP 
- M2/GDP 
- Black market premium 
- Property rights (ICRG) 
- Currency depreciation 
- Investor credit rating 
- Gini (income) 
- Confidence in government 
- Ethnic homogeneity 
- Trust and civic cooperation 
are associated with stronger 
economic performance. 
- Associational activity is not 
correlated with economic 
performance. 
- Trust and norms of civic 
cooperation are stronger in 
countries with formal 
institutions that effectively 
protect property and contract 
rights, and in countries that 
are less polarized along lines 
of class or ethnicity. 
Data: 
- The World Values 
Surveys containing data 
on thousands of 
respondents from 29 
market economies 
- International Country 







Mauro (1995) H: Efficient government 
institutions foster economic 
growth. Corruption and 
other institutional factors 
affect economic growth. 







- Index of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
- Bureaucratic efficiency index 
(BE) for 1980-1983 
- Political Change 
- Political Stability 
- Probability of Opposition 
- Corruption lowers private 
investment, thereby reducing 
economic growth. 
- Bureaucratic efficiency may 
be at least as important a 
determinant of investment 
and growth as political 
Data: 
- Business International 
(BI) indices on 
corruption, red tape, 
and the efficiency of the 
judicial system for the 
period 1980-1983 for 
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investment 
- Private investment/GDP 





- Stability of Labour 
- Relationship with 
Neighbouring Countries 
- Terrorism 
- Legal System, Judiciary 
- Bureaucracy and Red Tape 
- Corruption 
- Secondary education 
- Population growth 
- Primary education 
- Government expenditure 
- Revolutions and coups 
- Assassinations 






 Nunn (2008) H1: Large-scale plantation 
slavery resulted in economic 
inequality. 
H2: This resulted in 
subsequent 
underdevelopment. 
- Per capita GDP in 2000 - Fraction slaves 
- Nonplantation slaves 
- Plantation slaves  
- Population density 
 
- Slavery was detrimental for 
economic development. 
Data: 
- Historic population 
data from a variety of 
sources, most often 
population censuses 
- Data on country-level 
per capita GDP in 2000 
are from World Bank, 
Penn World Table 
- Population density 




Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
and land data are from 








H: Inequality is harmful for 
growth. 
- Annual average growth 
rate of GDP per capita 
- Income Distribution 
- Political Participation 
- Average Skills 
- The Level of Development 
- Initial GDP 
- There is a significant and 
large negative relation 
between inequality and 
growth. 
- This relation is only present 
in democracies. 
Data: 
- Cover 1830-1985 
period for 9 countries 
 - Summers and Heston 
dataset 
- U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
- World Bank 
- OECD 
Methodology: 
- Model building 
- OLS estimation 
- 2SLS estimation  
Persson and 
Tabellini (2008) 
H: There is a positive 
relation between democracy 
and growth. 
- Per capita income - Length of sample 
- Income relative to the United 
States 
- War years 
- Transitions from autocracy 
to democracy are associated 
with an average growth 
acceleration of about 1 
Data: 
- Annual per capita 
income data from Penn 
World Tables (1960-
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- Domestic democratic capital 
- Foreign democratic capital 
- Initial value of polity score 
percentage point, producing a 
gain in per capita income of 
about 13% by the end of the 
sample period. 
- The effect of transitions in 
the opposite direction is 
larger: a relapse from 
democracy to autocracy slows 
down growth by almost 2 
percentage points on average, 
which implies an income fall 
of about 45% at the end of the 
sample. 
2000) 





score methods, OLS 
estimation 
Scully (1988) H: The material progress 
mankind made in modern 
times has been affected 
significantly by the choice of 
the institutional framework 
designed to bring it about. 
- Economic growth over 
the period 1960-80 
- Economic efficiency 
- Change in economic 
efficiency 
- The compound growth rate 
of real per capita GDP 
- The compound growth rate 
in the capital-labour ratio 
- Politically liberal 
- Politically not liberal 
- Civil liberty 
- Limited civil liberty 
- Economic liberty 
- The institutional framework 
has significant and large 
effects on the efficiency and 
growth rate of economies. 
- Politically open societies, 
which subscribe to the rule of 
law, to private property, and 
to the market allocation of 
resources, grow at 3 times the 
rate and are 2.5 times as 
efficient as societies in which 
these freedoms are abridged. 
Data: 
- Cover 115 countries 
for 1960-1980 period 
- Gastil measures of 
liberty 
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Spindler (1991) H: There is appositive 
relation between economic 
freedom and economic 
development for most 
countries in the world. 
- Gross National Product 
per capita 
- Private GNP per capita 
- Economic freedom 
- Property freedom 
- Movement freedom 
- Association freedom 
- Information freedom 
- Civil liberties 
- Economic system 
- Dummy for oil exporting 
countries 
- Dummy for industrial 
countries 
- The relationship between 
economic freedom and 
economic development is 
strong and direct for such 
economic freedoms as 
freedom of property and 
freedom of movement but 
inverse for freedom of 
association. 
- The findings appear to be 
independent of the type of 
economic system or civil 
liberties, as measured by the 
Gastil ratings, which have 
their own important effects 
on economic development. 
Data: 
- Wright Economic 
Freedom Ratings 
covering 165 countries 






H: There is a relationship 
between per-capita income, 
the entrenchment of various 
rights in a country’s 
constitution and the level of 
economic freedom in a 
country. 
- GNP per capita - Education 
- Economic freedom 
- Political structure 
- Specific protections against 
tyranny 
- Social Rights 
- Entrenchment of any single 
right seldom has a significant 
general economic effect, while 
the effect of economic 
freedom is significant and 
substantial. 
- Education, economic 
freedom, population growth 
Data: 
- Cover 100 countries 
for 1988 
- UNDP Human 
Development Report 
1991 
- Scully and Slottje 
dataset 
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and the saving ratio together 
explain more than 75% of the 
cross-country variation in per 
capita income.  
- The entrenched elements of 
“Political structure”, 
“Protections from tyranny”, or 
“Social Charter” are not 
revealed as important 
explanatory variables. 








Appendix 2: Summary of previous econometric studies based on NIE by their focus 
 
Focus of the study Major Explanatory Variable(s) Data Sources Examples 
The relationship between 
historical institutions and 
present economic performance  
- Protection against expropriation risk 
- Constraint on executive 
- Democracy  
- European settler mortality 
- Continent dummies 
- Number of slaves 
- Population density 
- Land Gini 
- Political concentration index 
World Bank, Political Risk Services, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
(US), Atlas of World Population History, 
Harvard Centre for International 
Development’s Geography Database, the 
cadastral (land census) data, official 
newspapers, population census, the 
Colombian statistical agency (DANE) 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Acemoglu et 
al. (2008), Nunn (2008) 
The relationship between 
political institutions and 
economic growth 
- Polity score 
- GDP per capita 
- Executive independence 
- Constraints on executive power 
- Effectiveness of legislature 
- Government effectiveness 
- Political and civil rights 
- Ethnic fractionalization 
- Legal origin 
- The duration of the ruling group 
- Domestic and foreign democratic capital 
- Bureaucratic efficiency index 
Industrial Statistics Database of  the 
UNIDO, Polity IV database, Freedom House, 
Penn World Table, World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, Business International (BI), 
Heston and Summers dataset, Barro and 
Wolf dataset, Maddison dataset, 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Transparency International, Bollen index, 
Gastil index, World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department, UN’s Humana 
index, Summers and Heston dataset, Jodice 
Scully (1988), Helliwell (1994), 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Mauro 
(1995), Clague et al. (1996), Caselli et 
al. (1996), Alesina et al. (1996), Isham 
et al. (1997), Drury et al. (2006), 
Aghion et al. (2008), Besley and 
Kudamatsu  (2008), Persson and 
Tabellini (2008)  
 




Focus of the study Major Explanatory Variable(s) Data Sources Examples 
- Probability of opposition group takeover 
- Revolutions and coups 
- Assassinations 
- Gini coefficient of income and land 
distribution inequality 
- Primary school enrolment 
- Level of corruption 
- Life expectancy 
- Trade openness 
- Media pluralism 
- Freedom to organize  
and Taylor dataset 
The relationship between social 
structure and economic growth 
- Ethnic tensions 
- The percent of a country’s population 
belonging to the largest ethnic group 
- GDP per capita 
- Gini: income and land inequality 
- Ethnic homogeneity 
- Political violence 
- Regime type 
- Mean years of education 
- Property rights index 
- TRUST (the percentage of respondents in 
each nation replying “most people can be 
trusted”) 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
published by Political Risk Services, the 
World Values, Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence (BERI) 
  
Knack and Keefer (1997), Easterly and 
Levine (1997), P. Keefer and Knack 
(2002) 




Focus of the study Major Explanatory Variable(s) Data Sources Examples 
- CIVIC (the strength of civic norms) 
- Labour force growth 
- Currency depreciation 
- Investor credit rating 
- Confidence in government 
- Black market premium 
- Fiscal surplus 
- Infrastructure development 
- Assassinations 
- Financial depth 
The relationship between 
economic institutions 
(economic equality, protection 
of property rights etc.) and 
economic growth 
- GDP per capita 
- Schooling 
- Life expectancy 
- Fertility rate 
- Public educational spending  
- Rule-of-law index 
- Investment  
- Democracy index 
- Country and business risk index 
- Executive constraints 
- School enrolment 
- Labour force growth 
- The number of revolutions and coups 
- The number of political assassinations 
Summers-Heston data set, World Bank, 
Barro-Lee data set (Economics 
Department, Harvard University), Gastil 
measures of political rights, Deininger and 
Squire dataset, International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence (BERI), United Nations, 
Wright Economic Freedom Ratings, 
Business International Corporation, human 
development index, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, OECD, Scully and Slottje 
dataset, Taubenfel dataset 
 
Barro (1991), Spindler (1991), 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Vanssay 
and Spindler (1994), Barro  (1996), 
Keefer and Knack (1997), Barro  
(2000), Assane and Grammy (2003) 




Focus of the study Major Explanatory Variable(s) Data Sources Examples 
- Mortality rates for children aged 0-4 
- Student-teacher ratio 
- Adult literacy rate 
- Economic freedom 
- Property freedom 
- Movement freedom 
- Association freedom 
- Information freedom 
- Civil liberties 
- Physical capital formation 
- Labour force growth 
- Human capital formation 
- Income Distribution 
- Political Participation 
- Average Skills 
 
  




Appendix 3: Classification of variables employed in previous econometric studies based on NIE by what they measure 
 
Variables measuring presence of 
institutions 
Variables measuring organization of 
institutions 
Variables measuring outcome of 
institutions 
Control Variables 
- Ethnic fractionalization 
- Confidence in government 
- Revolutions and coups 




- Bureaucratic efficiency 
- Constraints on executive 
- Government effectiveness 
- Legislative effectiveness 
- Level of corruption 
- Political concentration 
- Regime type 
- Rule of law 
- Polity score 
- Security of property rights 
- Civil liberties 
- Political rights 
- Country and business risk  
- Economic freedom 
- GDP per capita 
- Investment level 
- Gini coefficient of income and land 
distribution inequality 
- School enrolment (education) 
- Fertility rate 
- Life expectancy 
- Literacy rate 
- Mortality rates 
for children 
- Population 
- Skills 
 
